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the USAF and DoD could have realized through the life of the F-16 fighter aircraft had 
they required engine commonality from the two engine manufacturers during the 
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 The lack of engine commonality between Pratt & Whitney (PW) F100-powered 
F-16s and General Electric Aviation Engines (GEAE) F110-powered F-16s results in two 
separate logistics support structures for life cycle management of each engine.  Engine 
commonality could lead to potential savings by:  (1) reducing inventory requirements at 
field, intermediate, and depot levels of both the F100 and F110, (2) eliminating one-
engine per base restrictions, and (3) reducing transportation requirements. 
 Our project analyzes the aftermath of the first “Great Engine War,” specifically as 
it applies to potential logistics cost savings had the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
United States Air Force (USAF) required engine commonality in the F-16 between the 
existing PW F100 series engines and the selected alternate fighter engine, the GEAE 
F110.  Insights developed from the analysis in this MBA Project will have applicability 
to the Joint Strike Fighter’s (JSF or F-35) engine procurement.  However, the analysis 
presented here seeks to provide insight to other future large-scale, high-dollar hardware 
acquisitions and not just fighter aircraft engines. 
 The F-35 is a multi-role fighter aircraft designed to replace the F-16, A-10, A/V-
8, and F-18 aircraft and to serve as a primary fighter aircraft for several allied nations.  In 
1994 Congress mandated the development of an alternative but common engine for the F-
35.  Pratt & Whitney won the initial competition as sole-source provider of the JSF’s 
engine (designated F135) based on its success with the F119 engine developed for the 
USAF’s F-22 fleet.  General Electric Aviation Engines (in partnership with Rolls-Royce) 
was later selected as the provider of the alternate engine (designated F136).  In many 
ways, this PW F135 and GEAE F136 scenario is a repeat of the “Great Engine War” of 
the late-1980s and 1990s fought over the PW F100 and GEAE F110 engines for the F-16 
(Amick, 2005). 
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 Department of Defense budgetary pressures resulted in a USAF proposal to 
cancel funding for the F136 engine in the fiscal year (FY) 2007 budget.  Congress, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and industry watchers and lobbyists decried 
this decision citing expected defense industrial capability and potential for future 
enhancements to capacity, increased performance, and cost savings associated with 
multiple (two) engine sources for the F-35 (Scully, 2006; Shalal-Esa, 2006; and 
Bolkcom, 2006). 
 In March 2007, Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management for the GAO, testified before the U. S. House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Air and Land Force, and Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces.  His testimony detailed the results of the GAO study Analysis of 
Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program, conducted in response to a 
requirement in the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (Section 
211).  The study identified significant benefits in maintaining engine competition for the 
JSF.  A summary of the findings is reprinted below: 
Continuing the alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter would 
cost significantly more than a sole-source program but could, in the long 
run, reduce costs and bring other benefits. The current estimated life cycle 
cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario is $53.4 
billion. To ensure competition by continuing to implement the JSF 
alternate engine program, an additional investment of $3.6 billion to $4.5 
billion may be required. However, the associated competitive pressures 
from this strategy could result in savings equal to or exceeding that 
amount. The cost analysis we performed suggests that a savings of 10.3 to 
12.3 percent would recoup that investment, and actual experience from 
past engine competitions suggests that it is reasonable to assume that 
competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that 
much. In addition, DoD-commissioned reports and other officials have 
said that nonfinancial benefits in terms of better engine performance and 
reliability, improved industrial base stability, and more responsive 
contractors are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment 
than under a sole-source strategy. 
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DoD experience with other aircraft engine programs, including the F-16 
fighter in the 1980s, has shown competitive pressures can generate 
financial benefits of up to 20 percent during the life cycle of an engine 
program and/or improved quality and other benefits. 
The potential for cost savings and performance improvements, along with 
the impact the engine program could have on the industrial base, 
underscores the importance and long-term implications of DoD decision 
making with regard to the final acquisition strategy solution (Sullivan, 
2007). 
In May 2007 Congress reestablished funding for the alternate engine (Cincinnati 
Business Courier, 2007). 
B. SCOPE 
 The FY2001 through FY2007 data collected for analysis consist of F-16 F100-
PW-220 and F110-GE-100 engine information for USAF Air Combat Command (ACC) 
and Air Education and Training Command (AETC) Continental United States (CONUS)-
based Active Duty (AD), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve (AFR) 
organizations.  The limits on the data available for inputs to the model created using the 
methodology in this MBA Project do not limit applicability of the model developed for 
commonality savings nor the methodology used to create the model. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
 The basic method for determining logistics cost savings is to estimate the savings 
that will result from pooling spare engine inventories, including safety stock, assumed 
possible by the interchangeable or common assumption.  The differences, if any, between 
the current numbers of F100 and F110 engines required when compared to the 
hypothesized alternative made possible by commonality will be the primary component 
in the cost savings estimate.  The assumption that there will be savings is made to anchor 
the sign for the resulting dollar figure only.  Positive cost savings is a potential reduction 
in expenditures by DoD and negative cost savings is a potential increase in DoD 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. OPEN ARCHITECTURE 
 Varying definitions of open architecture (OA) coexist.  Open Systems 
Architecture and Modular Open Systems Architecture are nearly synonymous with the 
generic OA concept.  Currently the use of the term OA is common in discussion of 
software design.  However, it has broad applicability to both hardware and software.  The 
DoD Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) defines OA as, “An architecture that 
employs open standards for key interfaces within a system” (Department of Defense, 
2007b).  It does not specify the system as a computer code or a system of physical parts 
or a system including both.  The OSJTF definition implies the need to define, during 
Concept Refinement in both the DoD Acquisition Framework and the Systems 
Engineering Process, what are the “key interfaces.” 
 The major assumption leading to the foregone logistics cost savings is that it was 
possible to require interchangeable F100 and F110 engines in the F-16 as a part of the 
Alternate Fighter Engine (AFE) procurement of the mid-1980s.  This would have 
required a series of open standards for the key interfaces between the engines and the 
airframe.  In addition to the physical dimensions, these interfaces include mounting 
points, throttle cable linkage, fuel line connections, electrical connections, et cetera.  The 
definition of these interfaces would follow the tenets of OA.  Then, we further assume it 
was possible for GEAE to replicate the PW F100 interfaces in the GEAE F110.  The 
results of this would have been an interchangeable engine, one that could be replaced by 
line mechanics on an aircraft in the field.  The F100-PW-220 and the F110-GE-100 
would have been “common.” 
 Taking an example from the automotive industry, General Motors Corporation 
(GMC) has adopted an OA allowing the insertion of either a 6.0L V8 gasoline engine or a 
6.6L V8 Diesel into the 2007 Sierra 2500HD pick-up.  This is the type of 
interchangeability we assume for the analysis that follows later in the paper.  It would be 
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rare for a customer to replace a gas with a diesel engine, but it certainly is possible due to 
the OA of the system, a GMC Sierra 2500HD (General Motors Corporation, 2007). 
 Further discussion on OA, Open Systems, and related topics is beyond the scope 
of this MBA Project. 
B. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT THEORY 
 Inventory is the “stock of any item or resource used in an organization” (Chase, 
Aquilano, & Jacobs, 2001).  Inventory analysis typically requires the identification of two 
key aspects of an operation:  1) size of re-supply orders and 2) timing of re-supply orders.  
In Operations Management for Competitive Advantage, Chase, Aquilano, & Jacobs 
(2001) state all firms maintain a supply of inventory for the following reasons: 
1.  To maintain independence of operations. 
2.  To meet variation in product demand. 
3.  To allow flexibility in production scheduling. 
4.  To provide a safeguard for variation in raw material delivery time. 
5.  To take advantage of economic purchase order size. 
 Inventory systems are classified into two broad categories, single-period and 
multi-period models, with further subdivision within the categories.  The single-period 
model assumes a perishable product and is typified by the “newsboy” problem:  A 
newsboy selling newspapers on a busy street corner must decide each day how many 
newspapers to stock.  If he stocks too many, his profits will be reduced by the cost of 
overstock (i.e. the cost of unsold papers).  If he stocks too few, his profits will be reduced 
by the cost of understock (i.e. the lost profit associated with missed sales opportunities) 
(Chase et al., 2001). 
 The multi-period model, the inventory categorization used in this MBA Project, is 
divided into two main subtypes, the fixed-order quantity model and fixed-time period 
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model.  In addition to perishability, the key differentiation between the multi-period 
model and the single-period model is the time horizon.  Multi-period models are 
“designed to ensure that an item will be available on an ongoing basis throughout the 
year.  Usually the item will be ordered multiple times throughout the year where the logic 
in the system dictates the actual quantity ordered and the timing of the order” (Chase et 
al., 2001).  Within the multi-period model group, the essential distinction between fixed-
order and fixed-time models is the “trigger” initiating product reorder or replenishment.  
Fixed-order quantity models are “event triggered,” meaning product inventory reaching a 
specified reorder level (also called reorder point or ROP) initiates the reorder event.  A 
key operational requirement of this model is constant inventory monitoring and inventory 
record updates to accurately signal inventories reaching the ROP.  Fixed-time period 
models are “time triggered,” meaning product inventory is reordered with the passage of 
a predetermined period of time (Chase et al., 2001). 
 In most inventory models, including the model in this MBA Project, demand 
varies from day to day.  To compensate for demand variability, inventory models include 
provisions for safety stock to provide protection against stockouts, or reaching an 
inventory level of zero and therefore being unable to meet any customer demand.  Chase, 
et al, (2001) define safety stock as “the amount of inventory carried in addition to the 
expected demand.”  If product demand can be represented as a normal distribution, with a 
mean and a standard deviation, then expected demand (i.e., daily, weekly, or monthly 
demand, etc.) would be the mean.  Accordingly, based on the characteristics of a normal 
distribution, setting the mean of expected demand as the inventory objective would 
prevent stockouts only 50 percent of the time.  Safety stock is inventory held above the 
mean to reduce the probability of a stockout (Chase et al., 2001). 
 Of critical importance to this model is the management decision regarding the 
desired level of customer service.  Fiscal imperatives, particularly with costly end items 
such as aircraft engines, inhibit the ability to prevent against all stockouts, or a customer 
service level of 100 percent.  Schmenner (1993) suggests management must assess four 
key factors to determine the appropriate customer service level: 
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1.  Order frequency. 
2.  Lead time, or time required to receive replenishment. 
3.  Stability of demand. 
4.  Relative costs of stockout versus inventory carrying. 
Additionally, safety stock levels should be monitored and adjusted over time to reflect 
changing demand and changes to the operating environment.  “It is important to keep in 
mind the fact that safety stocks should be used.  If a safety stock is not dipped into 
regularly, then inventory is too high and should be reduced” (Schmenner, 1993). 
 Using the normal distribution, it is possible to calculate the required safety stock 
to prevent stockout condition at any probabilistic value.  For example, to establish the 
probability of not stocking out at approximately 84 percent, a firm should carry one 
standard deviation of inventory as safety stock.  At a more commonly used probability of 
not stocking out of 95 percent, a firm should carry approximately 1.645 standard 
deviations of safety stock.  With, for example, a standard deviation of demand 10 and 
1.645 standard deviations of safety stock, a firm would attempt to schedule product 
resupply so that it possessed 16 units of safety stock (1.645 X 10, rounded) when the 
order arrived.  Obviously, since the firm has set the probability of not stocking out at 95 
percent, this inventory does not prevent stockouts.  Rather, it reduces the probability of 
stockouts occurring to approximately 1 of every 20 replenishment periods.  Likewise, a 
probability of not stocking out set at 99 percent requires a larger safety stock (23 from 
this example or 2.326 X 10, rounded) and reduces the stockout risk to approximately 1 of 
every 100 periods (Chase et al., 2001).  (See Appendix B, Basic Inventory Management 




 Many operations realize safety stock reduction through pooled variance, where 
variance is the square of the standard deviation of demand.  Pooled variance takes 
advantage of a simple, but not altogether obvious mathematical concept represented by 
the following formula: 
baba +<+ 22  
This formula illustrates the mathematical fact that the standard deviation of a sum of 
positive random variables, in our case the square root of a2 + b2, is always less than the 
sum of their standard deviations, a + b.  Put another way, if the safety stock at location A 
is 10 and the safety stock at location B is 10, then the sum of the safety stock, or the sum 
of their standard deviations, is 20.  However, pooling safety stock at a central location 
results in a reduction in safety stock.  In this case, the pooled safety stock is 14.14 (square 
root of 102 + 102), a reduction of nearly 6 units.  This formula holds true as long as the 
safety stock is greater than zero, which should always be the case in a stochastic demand 
situation, or one involving chance or probability, and the demands are independent 
(Kang, 2007). 
C. FACILITY LOCATION METHODS 
 There are two basic levels of analysis for locating facilities in an industrial 
network:  Macro analysis and micro analysis.  Macro analysis involves the evaluation of 
“alternative regions, subregions, and communities,” where facilities do not currently 
exist.  Micro analysis, the focus of this study, involves the evaluation of specific 
preexisting sites in the selected community of suppliers and customers (Chase & 
Aquilano, 1995).   
1. Center of Gravity Method 
 Within micro analysis, the center of gravity (COG) method is a technique 
employed to locate a single facility considering the “existing facilities, the distances 
between them, and the volume of goods to be shipped” (Chase & Aquilano, 1995).  The 
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COG method attempts to minimize travel time and/or distance between supply and 
demand points, and minimize shipping costs and response time.  Typically, this method is 
used to determine locations for intermediate or distribution warehouses (Chase & 
Aquilano, 1995). In the model created for this MBA Project, the authors assume 
transportation costs are the same for inbound and outbound transportation, and do not 
include additional shipping costs for less than full loads as USAF fighter aircraft engines 
are shipped within the CONUS in lot sizes of one engine and via fairly stable pre-
negotiated service contracts. 
 To use the COG method, place existing locations (in our study, USAF AD, ANG, 
and AFR bases) on a coordinate grid system, using latitude and longitude coordinates.  A 
simple version of a map used in this process is reproduced in the figure below: 








Figure 1 – Map Grid of Continental United States 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Professor Geraldo Ferrer (Ferrer, 2007) 
 11
 The map grid system is used both to determine relative distance between 
locations, but also to help visualize the dispersal or arrangement of locations.  The COG 
is found by calculating the X and Y coordinates (X along the horizontal map axis 
(longitude); Y along the vertical map axis (latitude)) resulting in the lowest total 
transportations costs.  The COG formula is as shown in the figure below: 























Figure 2 – Center of Gravity Formulae 
where: 
CX = X coordinate of the center of gravity 
CY = Y coordinate of the center of gravity 
dix = X coordinate of the ith location 
diy = Y coordinate of the ith location 
Wi = Volume of goods moved to the ith location 
 
 The results of the COG formula provide a theoretical ideal location; however, the 
result may not be a practical location.  The resulting X and Y coordinates may not be 
located near existing transportation nodes such as interstate highways and/or rail systems.  
Accordingly, a proper siting requires subjective analysis of the resulting coordinates and 
proximity to available transportation networks and appropriate infrastructure (Chase & 
Aquilano, 1995).  This limitation of the COG formula proves problematic in relation to 
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this MBA Project.  The authors have assumed engine stockage must be at a pre-existing 
USAF location, using existing manpower and facilities. 
2. Ardalan Heuristic Method 
 Where the COG method provides a single “ideal” location without respect to 
existing locations, the Ardalan Heuristic identifies multiple, rank-ordered “ideal” 
locations for distribution centers based on existing locations.  The objectives of the 
Ardalan Heuristic are to minimize the total weighted distance goods travel and to identify 
multiple locations in order of strategic value, considering pre-specified locations only 
(Ferrer, 2007). 
 To use the Ardalan Method, construct a matrix of existing locations (customers) 
and distances and transportation costs from each location to every other location, and 
demand at each location.  Then, assign a subjective prioritized weight to the most 
important customers.  An example of this matrix is reproduced in the figure below, where 
columns A through D represent the distance (unit of distance is irrelevant as long as it is 
consistent) from each location to each location, and demand is for a quantity of item(s) 
during a specific time period (time period is also irrelevant as long as it is consistent): 
 
FROM A B C D DEMAND WEIGHT
A 0 11 8 12 10 1.1
B 11 0 10 7 8 1.4
C 8 10 0 9 20 0.7
D 12 7 9 0 12 1
TO
 
Figure 3 – Matrix of Distances, Demand, and Weight 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Dr. Ron Tibben-Lembke (Tibben-Lembke, 2007) 
 




FROM A B C D
A 0 121 88 132
B 123.2 0 112 78.4
C 112 140 0 126
D 144 84 108 0
TOTAL 379.2 345 308 336.4
TO
 
Figure 4 – Matrix of Weighted Values 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Dr. Ron Tibben-Lembke (Tibben-Lembke, 2007) 
 
The best source location is identified as the location with the smallest sum of total 
weighted values.  In this example, that is location C, identified in the figure below with 
the lowest sum of weighted values: 
 
FROM A B C D
A 0 121 88 132
B 123.2 0 112 78.4
C 112 140 0 126
D 144 84 108 0
TOTAL 379.2 345 308 336.4
TO
 
Figure 5 – Sum of Weighted Values 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Dr. Ron Tibben-Lembke (Tibben-Lembke, 2007) 
If another distribution location is required, the values must be modified to reflect the 
removal of the first best location as a potential candidate.  If any value in each row (i.e., 
the horizontal values) is larger than the value in the best location column (Column C in 
this example), set the value equal to the value in Column C.  This is demonstrated below, 
where changed values are indicated by italic font and a block border: 
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FROM A B C D
A 0 88 88 88
B 112 0 112 78.4
C 0 0 0 0
D 108 84 108 0
TOTAL 220 172 308 166.4
TO
 
Figure 6 – Modified Sum of Weighted Values 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Dr. Ron Tibben-Lembke (Tibben-Lembke, 2007) 
Then, remove the previously chosen column (Column C in this example) and repeat the 
process until enough locations are selected to meet requirements.  As demonstrated in the 
following figure, the next best location would be location D: 
FROM A B D
A 0 88 88
B 112 0 78.4
C 0 0 0
D 108 84 0
TOTAL 220 172 166.4
TO
 
Figure 7 – Remaining Sum of Weighted Values 
Figure adapted from lecture notes of Dr. Ron Tibben-Lembke (Tibben-Lembke, 2007) 
 
D. F-16 DESCRIPTION 
 The Lockheed Martin F-16 “Fighting Falcon” is a multi-role fighter aircraft used 
by the USAF, United States Navy (USN) and over twenty other nations.  Since it became 
operational in the USAF in 1979 (Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, 2006), 
over 4,000 F-16s have been produced, in over 100 different versions (Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, 2005). 
 The F-16 was constructed in a unique multi-national agreement between the 
United States and four North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations:  Belgium, 
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Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway (Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, 
2006).  Long-term benefits of the multi-national production effort were technology 
transfer and a common-use aircraft for NATO nations.  Additionally, the program design 
enhanced combat readiness by increasing the supply and availability of repair parts in the 
European Theater (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005).  In many ways, this presaged the much 
larger multi-national effort to construct the JSF. 
 The original operational version of the F-16 was the single-seat F-16A, first flown 
by the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah, one of the sites 
for this study.  The F-16B is the two-seat or tandem model, typically used for training 
purposes (Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, 2006).   
 Different production versions of the F-16 were originally distinguished by the 
“block” designation.  The first production block was the Block 01 aircraft.  Successive 
modifications resulted in the Block 05 and Block 10 aircraft.  These three versions of the 
F-16 were virtually identical externally, and over time all Block 01 and Block 05 aircraft 
were upgraded to Block 10 equivalency (Fieser, 2006). 
 The first major modifications to production line F-16s resulted in the fielding of 
the Block 15 version, also called the Multinational Staged Improvement Program 
modification.  These aircraft were distinguished by exterior modifications to the 
horizontal stabilizers and hard points (enhanced external mounting of weapons and 
various pods) and cockpit instrumentation arrangement changes (Fieser, 2006). 
 Block 25 aircraft were the first aircraft to receive the designation F-16C/D, also 
referred to as “second generation” F-16s.  These production changes included major 
internal redesign of the aircraft such as enhanced display screens, a larger heads-up 
display, and improved radar.  All Block 01, 05, 10, 15, and 25 aircraft were powered by 
the PW F100-PW-200 engine, the original engine designed for the F-16 (Fieser, 2006). 
 The Block 20 aircraft were actually produced after production had already started 
on the Block 50 models (Fieser, 2006).  Also, Block 20 aircraft received PW’s enhanced 
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engine design, the F110-PW-220, which reflected major modifications and improvements 
following the “Great Engine War” (Drewes, 1987). 
 The AFE competition of the 1980s between PW and GEAE to provide engines for 
the F-16 resulted in the “common engine bay” design, coupled with numerous 
modifications and upgrades to software, avionics, offensive and defensive capabilities, 
and internal fuel tanks.  These significant modifications resulted in an upgraded block 
designation, Block 30 or 32.  The first versions of the Block 30/32 were for foreign 
military sales (FMS) deliveries in December 1985, and subsequent USAF deliveries in 
July 1986 (Jane's Information Group, 2007a).  Following the AFE competition, both PW 
and GEAE produced aircraft engines for USAF and FMS F-16 fighter aircraft.  The 
customer-identified performance requirements were identical; however, the engines were 
not compatible and certainly not common.  Lockheed-Martin produced structurally 
different F-16 aircraft (distinguished by block designation) to use the different engines.  
For example, aircraft with production block numbers ending in zero (i.e., Blocks 30, 40 
and 50) were designed and constructed to use the GEAE F110 series engine.  Aircraft 
with block numbers ending in two (i.e., Block 32, 42 and 52) were designed and 
constructed to use the PW F100 series engine.  With the exception of the engine and its 
associated operating limitations and emergency procedures, a Block 40 and Block 42 
aircraft are essentially identical.  The same relationship exists between the Block 50 and 
Block 52 (Dewitte & Vanhastel, 2007). 
 The common engine bay design, initiated with the Block 30/32, was “common” in 
theory only.  Open systems architecture did not exist between PW and GEAE F-16 
engine bays.  To accommodate the increased airflow requirements for the GEAE F110 
engine, Lockheed Martin modified and enlarged the engine inlet on Block 30, 40, and 50 
aircraft.  This modification was built in during production.  This resulted in significantly 
different aircraft profiles and the monikers GEAE “Big Mouth” inlet and PW “Small 
Mouth” inlet.  Accordingly, the engines are not interchangeable between different block 
designations.  For example, it is not possible (at the field level) to install a PW engine in a 
GEAE block aircraft, and vice versa. 
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Figure 8 – “Big Mouth” and “Small Mouth” F-16C, Intake View 
Source:  http://www.habu2.net/vipers/viperblocks/  08/2007 
The pictures above are of an F-16C Block 30 with “Big Mouth” inlet (at left) and an F-
16C Block 32, with “Small Mouth” inlet (at right). 
 
 
Figure 9 – “Big Mouth” and “Small Mouth” F-16C, Exhaust View 
Source:  http://www.habu2.net/vipers/viperblocks/  08/2007 
 
 18
The pictures above show the external differences of the engines’ exhaust nozzles or 
“turkey feathers,” F-16 Block 30 (at left) and F-16C Block 32 (at right).  
 Successive production upgrades of USAF F-16s were for the Block 40/42 in late 
1990 and the Block 50/52 in May 1993.  Foreign military sales versions extended the 
block designation to the Block 60, which is also called the F-16E/F (Jane's Information 
Group, 2007a). 
 Appendix C of this document contains additional specifications and performance 
attributes of USAF F-16s.  
E. F-16 ENGINES 
 This section is primarily limited to a discussion of the GEAE F110-GE-100 and 
PW F100-PW-220 engines, as those are the engines of interest for this study.  For a 
detailed description of the F100 and F110 specifically written for readers unfamiliar with 
aircraft engines, refer to Appendix D. 
 
1. Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-220 
 Pratt & Whitney’s F100 series engines have been used to power both the USAF’s 
F-15 and F-16 aircraft.  Originally fielded as the F100-PW-100 engine, the USAF 
selected PW’s engine for the dual-engine F-15 beginning in 1972.  The F100-PW-200 
engine was selected over GEAE’s offering as the sole source engine for the single-engine 
F-16.  With the implementation of the AFE competition for the F-16 in 1985, PW fielded 
the F100-PW-220 version to compete with GEAE’s F110-GE-100 engine (Jane's 
Information Group, 2006a).  F-16 Block 32 aircraft were the first aircraft to employ the   
F100-PW-220 engine (Fieser, 2006). 
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2.   General Electric Aviation Engine’s F110-GE-100 
 General Electric Aviation Engine’s F110 series engines have been used to power 
USAF F-16 aircraft and USN F-14 aircraft.  The F110 series engine is a derivative of the 
F101 engine used to power the USAF’s B-1B bomber fleet.  According to GEAE, “fully 
86% of the USAF F-16C/Ds and 75% of all front line, combat coded F-16s are powered 
by the GE(AE) F110” (General Electric Company, 2007). 
F.   F-35 DESCRIPTION 
 The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the JSF, is a multi-role strike fighter 
currently in production for the United States Air Force, Marines, Navy, and American 
allies.  The JSF is designed to provide next-generation capabilities through an 
“…advanced airframe, autonomic logistics, avionics, propulsion systems, stealth, and 
firepower…” and to be “…the most affordable, lethal, supportable and survivable aircraft 
ever to be used by so many warfighters across the globe” (Department of Defense, 
2007a).  According to the GAO, the JSF is DoD’s most expensive aircraft acquisition 
program.  Over the course of the program’s life cycle, DoD is “…expected to develop, 
procure, and maintain 2,443 aircraft at a cost of more than $338 billion (expressed in 
fiscal year 2002 dollars)…” (Sullivan, 2007). 
 In November 1996 the JSF program “began” with a 5-year contract competition 
between the United States’ two fighter-aircraft producing firms:  Lockheed Martin 
(teaming with Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace) and Boeing.  The JSF 
competition followed on the heels of the USAF’s award of the F-22 Raptor program to a 
Lockheed Martin-led team (including Boeing as a subcontractor), using a PW engine, in 
April 1991 (Jane's Information Group, 2007b).  At the conclusion of the competition 
phase in October 2001, DoD selected Lockheed Martin’s design and awarded the largest 
military contract ever, potentially worth $200 billion (GlobalSecurity.org, 2007a), to 
produce the F-35. 
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 The program now referred to as the JSF Program had its origin as far back as the 
early 1990s.  The JSF Program is the result of the merger of separate USAF and USN 
Joint Advanced Strike Technology projects and the Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency’s Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter project in November 1994 (Jane's 
Information Group, 2006b).  Early development and program requirements were for three 
JSF variants to support the varied needs of its users:  conventional takeoff/landing (F-
35A), short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) (F-35B), and carrier variant (F-35C) 
aircraft (GlobalSecurity.org, 2007a).  The F-35B is fundamentally different from the A 
and C versions.  The B version incorporates a shaft-driven lift fan to provide the STOVL 
capability.  This capability allows the aircraft to takeoff and land without the use of a 
runway similar to the AV-8B Harrier aircraft currently in service with the United States 
Marine Corps.  Put another way, the F-35B can fly like an airplane, but takeoff and land 
like a helicopter.  The carrier variant F-35C is slightly larger and heavier than the A 
version.  The C version has larger control surfaces to mitigate the difficulty of carrier 
landings and a more robust internal structure to support carrier catapult launches and 




Figure 10 – F-35A, Conventional Takeoff/Landing Version 
Source:  http://www2.janes.com/janesdata/yb/jawa/images/p1185921.jpg  09/2007 
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Figure 11 – F-35B, Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing Version 
Note the lift fan mechanism at the mid-dorsal portion of the aircraft 




Figure 12 – F-35C, Carrier Version 
Note the tailhook at the aft-ventral portion of the aircraft 
Source:  http://www2.janes.com/janesdata/yb/jawa/images/p0528624.jpg  09/2007 
The F-35 will replace “legacy” fighter aircraft including “U.S. Air Force A-10s and F-
16s, U.S. Navy F-14s and F/A-18s, U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18s, and 
U.K. Harrier GR-7s and Sea Harriers” (Department of Defense, 2007a). 
 The hallmark of JSF procurement is “…affordability based on a next-generation, 
multi-role strike fighter aircraft that will have a 70 to 90 percent commonality factor for 
all the variants, significantly reducing manufacturing, support and training costs” 
(Department of Defense, 2007a).  Delivery of the first operational aircraft is expected in 
FY2008 and the full delivery will employ a phased block approach (Department of 
Defense, 2007a). 
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 The development and procurement of the F-35 is similar to that of its F-16 
predecessor; however, on a much larger scale.  The F-35 is a true multi-service and multi-
nation cooperative procurement effort.  The principal international partner in the 
development and procurement of the F-35 is the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, 
becoming a “full collaborative partner in the program in 1995” (Department of Defense, 
2007a).  Additionally Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, and The Netherlands have joined 
the program as cooperative partners. Israel, Turkey, and Singapore, all significant users 
of the F-16, are FMS participants in the program (Department of Defense, 2007a). 
G.   F-35 ENGINES 
 The F-35 acquisition strategy requires the development of two competing 
propulsion systems.  Pratt & Whitney was awarded the principal contract for over $4 
billion for engine development for all three variants, resulting in the F135, a derivative of 
the F119 engine used in the F-22 Raptor.  The PW engine competes with an engine 
developed by GEAE, in partnership with Rolls-Royce, the F136 (Department of Defense, 
2007a).  General Electric and Rolls-Royce formed a joint venture for engine production 
in July 2002, with Rolls-Royce having a 40% share of the program.  Additionally, Rolls-
Royce provided all key components for the STOVL system for both the F135 and F136 
engines.  Engine competition between PW and GEAE begins in fiscal year 2011, when 
production is expected to have delivered less that 100 aircraft, and will continue 
throughout the life of the F-35 program (Rolls-Royce plc, 2007). 
 Unlike the engine competition for the F-16, F-35 propulsion systems are required 
to be “physically and functionally interchangeable in both the aircraft and support 
systems,” meaning “…all JSF aircraft variants will be able to use either engine” 
(Department of Defense, 2007a).  According to the DoD’s Joint Strike Fighter Program 
Office, “the F135 and F136 teams are working closely to develop common propulsion 
system components. This unique arrangement of ‘COOPETITION’ (emphasis in original) 
was spawned by the JSF Program's emphasis on affordability” (Department of Defense, 
2007a).  Unlike the F100 and F110, the F135 and F136 employ the concepts of an open 
systems architecture. 
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1.   Pratt & Whitney’s F135 
 The F135 engine is expected to cost 35% less throughout its life (life cycle cost) 
than existing (legacy) propulsion systems such as the F100.  Compared to legacy 
systems, the F135 will have “three times the hardware and software reliability and will 
require 30 to 50% fewer maintenance technicians and 50% fewer airlift assets in 
deployment” (GlobalSecurity.org, 2007b).   
2.   General Electric Aviation Engine’s F136 
 The F136 engine is leveraging technological advances from commercial engine 
development and is expected to yield dramatically increased inspection intervals.  “The 
goal is to lengthen the military's inspection intervals from the common practice of checks 
after 500 hr. toward the 10,000 hr. interval common to the commercial aviation field” 
(Watershed Publishing LLC, 2005).   
H.   CURRENT USAF ENGINE MANAGEMENT POLICIES1 
 Generally, engine maintenance technicians remove engines from aircraft for three 
principal reasons:  (1)  Engine failure or unscheduled maintenance requirements 
(unscheduled engine removal or UER), (2) scheduled or preventive maintenance 
requirements (scheduled engine removal or SER), and (3) to facilitate other maintenance 
(FOM), meaning the engine is fully operable/serviceable but must be removed from the 
aircraft to provide access to other components or structures within the aircraft requiring 
maintenance2.  Engine removal from the airframe is termed “creating a hole.” 
                                                 
1 Much of this section is based on the authors’ operational experience as a Maintenance Officer of an 
F-16 Aircraft Maintenance Unit (Henderson) and as an Operational and Developmental Test Pilot of F-16 
aircraft (Higer).  Additionally, the authors relied upon conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Larry Gatti 
and Mr. James Estes, both of Air Combat Command’s Systems Support Division (HQ ACC/A4M) for 
clarification/validation. 
2 Engines may also be removed in accordance with the Engine Lead the Fleet (PACER) Program 
requirements.  However, these removals comprise an exceptionally small percentage of total engine 
removals.  See Air Force Instruction 21-104 for a more complete discussion of the PACER Program. 
 26
 At USAF AD F-16 locations, day-to-day operational requirements and leadership 
culture view “holes” as negative indicators of readiness.  Leadership aggressively tracks 
the status of engine changes and views changes requiring more than 24 hours negatively.  
This culture is in direct contrast with ANG and AFR units.  Guard and Reserve units 
historically have holes that are driven by their maintenance philosophy and the 
methodological differences between how AD and AFR/ANG are manned and operate 
during peacetime.   Guard and Reserve units typically have fewer assigned aircraft and, 
therefore, have a lower spare engine inventory.  Additionally, AFR/ANG operations are 
not “manned” at the same levels or at the same frequency (i.e., daily) as their AD 
counterparts.  Accordingly, AFR/ANG units are accustomed to having aircraft holes.  
These resource and cultural differences significantly impact assumptions and parameters 
used in the engine stockage decision model discussed later in this paper. 
 Recent USAF manpower and process re-engineering initiatives (i.e., Air Force 
Smart Operations for the 21st Century) targeted base-level intermediate engine 
maintenance tasks for elimination/consolidation.  Prior to these efforts, each operational 
location had specific engine maintenance capabilities, referred to as “retained tasks.”  In 
some cases, an engine or engine components (modules) may be removed and transported 
to the engine maintenance depot at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, without any maintenance 
action by local technicians.  In other cases, local technicians may be capable of 
performing the required maintenance action and returning the engine to serviceable or 
Ready for Issue (RFI) status.  However, beginning in FY2007, bases lost the capability to 
perform maintenance tasks on uninstalled, or removed from the airframe, F100 and F110 
engines.  Removed, unserviceable engines must be shipped to either a regional 
maintenance facility (similar to stock consolidation locations identified in this MBA 
Project, see Section IV.F., G., & I.) or to Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, for depot-level 
maintenance.  This MBA Project is predicated on the elimination of retained tasks at the 
base-level and the overall concept of maintenance operations discussed above. 
 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21-104, Selective Management of Selected Gas 
Turbine Engines, provides USAF-wide guidance and direction and identifies 
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responsibilities required to manage specific USAF aircraft engines, including both the 
F100 and F110 series engines.  Chapter 7 of AFI 21-104, Whole Engine Spares 
Requirements Computations, establishes USAF-wide engine acquisition and distribution 
levels.  The acquisition computation identifies the total number of whole spare engines 
(differentiated from acquisition of engine components and parts) to provide support to 
appropriate aircraft (also referred to as “weapon system”) throughout the life of the 
engine and/or weapon system.  The distribution computation identifies the quantity and 
locations of spare engines based on engine reliability factors and current planning policy 
such as peacetime and wartime operational requirements.  These computations are 
derived from the USAF’s Propulsion Requirements System (PRS) (Department of the Air 
Force, 2007b).  The authors were not able to obtain access to the data used to compute 
the distribution computation, nor is that data readily available in a simple, tabulated 
single-source format. 
 Base level spare engine inventory is computed in PRS and a safety stock is added 
at each location.  The protection level is based on the primary mission code assigned to 
each location.  In the case of bases used in this project, the primary mission coding is 
either combat-coded (designated as “CC”) or training-coded (designated as “TF”).  
Combat coded locations (such as Hill AFB and Cannon AFB) are supported at the 80 
percent service level; training-coded locations (only Luke AFB in this project) are 
supported at the 70 percent service level (D. Keeton, personal communication, August 
29, 2007).   
 A more thorough discussion of the modeling inputs and rationale behind engine 
stockage decisions is well beyond the scope of this MBA Project.  However, of 
importance is the notion of an inventory level computation for each location including 
safety stocks.  Safety stock is described in AFI 21-104 as protecting “…against pipeline 
shortages due to the uncertainty in the forecasted demand, repair production processes, 
and transportation pipeline performance” (Department of the Air Force, 2007b).  This 
definition is consistent with inventory management theories previously discussed (see 
Section II.B., Inventory Management Theory).   
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I.   BASIC USAF SUPPLY PROCEDURES 
 This section explains a key concept upon which the authors have based their 
model and concept of operations for proposed logistics savings from commonality.  That 
concept is the USAF’s use of lateral support to fill requirements. 
 The USAF defines lateral support as a process used by retail supply activities (i.e., 
AFBs) to requisition required supplies and items from other AFBs, versus USAF or 
Defense Logistics Agency-managed depot stocks.  Lateral support is often used to fulfill 
mission capable (MICAP) requirements.  The USAF uses the web-based MICAP Asset 
Sourcing System to provide worldwide visibility of key stocks and supplies and process 
shipments between locations (Department of the Air Force, 2007a).  This is an example 
of a virtual stock consolidation.  Thus, the USAF possesses an extant system and set of 
procedures required to control and conduct shipment of assets between operational 
locations.  For a more complete discussion of USAF supply procedures, refer to Air 
Force Manual 23-110. 
 De facto procedures exist within the maintenance communities to provide lateral 
support for engines.  However, this is an extremely rare practice and, if used, is usually 
employed at the intra-command level (i.e., between AD ACC) bases).  Typical of this 
type of lateral support is an agreement between bases to exchange receipt of next-
available serviceable modules or engines returning from depot-level repair.  For example, 
a base may agree to “swap” the rights to the receipt of the next serviceable engine with 
another base, due to changing operational circumstances or increased need for serviceable 
engines or modules at that location.  Cultural differences between AD and AFR/ANG, 
such as those discussed in Section II.H. above, and the complexity of funding issues have 
prevented this practice from becoming more common. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   ALTERNATE FIGHTER ENGINE COMPETITION STUDY 
 In 1986, Jeffrey A. Hoover published the Alternate Fighter Engine Competition 
Study, a detailed analysis of the preliminary budget impacts of the USAF’s procurement 
competition for engines for the F-16.  This study, which predated Colonel Robert 
Drewes’ seminal book The Air Force and the Great Engine War by one year, is 
significant in that it provided the USAF’s first in-depth analysis of cost results following 
the highly controversial decision to initiate the engine competition. 
 In the summary, Hoover makes two significant claims, the first being, “This study 
supports the contention that competition is beneficial to all procurement processes” 
(Hoover, 1986).  This is a regrettable statement in that his paper only addresses 
competition with respect to F-16 fighter aircraft engines, and not a wider analysis of 
procurement processes. 
 Hoover’s second claim is that, “The infusion of competition causes improvements 
to pricing and quality” (Hoover, 1986).  With respect to the F-16, these claims are well 
supported throughout the article, and he also provides an acknowledgment and response 
to alternate analysis of cost data.  Hoover clearly presents sound, relevant data and tables 
to support this claim.  While not specifically stated in the introduction as a central 
argument, Hoover nonetheless presents a convincing case to the reader that competition 
does result in improvements to pricing and quality. 
B.   THE AIR FORCE AND THE GREAT ENGINE WAR 
 Colonel Drewes covers the history of PW’s F100 engine, from its development in 
parallel with the F-15 through the mid-1980s after the first three rounds of the annual 
AFE competition.  He also details GEAE’s F110 engine development history.   
 The thesis of Colonel Drewes’ work is that competition in the high tech world of 
engine procurement, and similar fields, is good for the government and the best way to 
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get a better product.  He continues with point after point on the ways competition 
improved the F100 engine and the contracts between the USAF and PW.  The F110 
genesis was beneficial in that it forced PW to become responsive to the USAF.  He 
makes the following claims to support his thesis: 
What is already absolutely clear, though, is the importance of maintaining 
the competitive environment as far into the future as possible. 
and 
The most important lesson to draw from the engine experience is the value 
of competition. Competition is the only sure way to get the best effort 
(Drewes, 1987). 
 Another critical component of the AFE competition was the USAF-derived 
benefits from the increased thrust capability of the F110 and other operationally relevant 
benefits.  Although Colonel Drewes is fast to point out the results are not conclusive, he 
points to forecast USAF savings of 30-50% in cost per flight hour, reduced cost of 
maintenance, and reduced removals per 1,000 flight hours (Drewes, 1987).  While these 
data are not directly applicable to our subject, they are authoritative examples of the 
magnitude of savings from competition in engines. 
 Colonel Drewes points to large potential future savings by the USAF in the re-
procurement of engine parts and warranty clauses of the post-AFE contracts.  He also 
details the challenges presented to the USAF in maximizing the utility of these contract 
provisions. 
 Colonel Drewes does not identify any exact dollar figure for the GEAE 
development of the F110 or on the costs of a completely new engine.  However, he does 
give insight into how difficult, costly, and time consuming it is to develop an engine from 
scratch as is summarized in this quote, “Some experts on engines believe (engine) 
designs require three to four more years to complete than the airframe” (Drewes, 1987).  
General Electric may have been in a significant position of advantage to develop an F100 
alternative for the F-16.  Cost reductions from the symbiotic relationship of the F110 to 
 31
the B-1 F101 and the KC-135 CFM-56 were largely responsible for the sustainment of 
the AFE program.  This resulted in an estimated 25% savings in starting the F110 
program.   
 While field level “plug and play” maintenance options are not addressed, GEAE 
was also well suited to develop an “interchangeable” engine as a derivative of its GE 1 
engine.  Colonel Drewes explains, 
The basic idea of the GE concept was to design a family of engines, each 
one aimed at a specific market.  The family would have an identical, or 
nearly identical, core consisting of the compressor, combustor, and 
turbine.  Depending on the aircraft to be powered, the combination of 
additional engine components (fans, afterburners, and thrust vectoring 
devices) could be tailored to meet the exact performance requirements for 
the aircraft. With this building block scheme, having the common engine 
core upon which all other tailor-made components were added, GE could 
compete for virtually any type of aircraft jet propulsion system, save costs 
in manufacturing, and save time in meeting schedules. The project for this 
concept, established in February 1962 and designated GE 1, cradled the 
company's hopes for the future. As reported in GE's official corporate 
history, the GE 1 “building block concept” is perhaps the most significant 
business/technology achievement to date in its aircraft engine history 
(Drewes, 1987). 
 In the 1970s, GEAE had experience with several “interchangeable” jet turbine 
configurations on commercial airplanes at the time of original sale.  Colonel Drewes does 
not expand on the definition of “interchangeable.” 
 While GEAE had significant time to develop an engine, they only had 30 months 
of official time to get their in-house developed F101X into an F-16 to begin testing.  
Colonel Drewes does not detail how similar the F-16 testing the F101X needed to be to 
those powered by the F100.  He does not give any detail on the logistics challenges or 
plans of having the two parallel engines in the supply chain.  Nor does he ever use the 
word “commonality” or indirectly imply the concept. 
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C.   ANALYSIS OF THE AIR FORCE AND THE GREAT ENGINE WAR 
 A key follow-up work to Colonel Drewes’ book is a master’s thesis (U.S. Air 
Force Institute of Technology) by Victoria Mayes, titled Analysis of the Air Force and 
the Great Engine War.  Her thesis primarily focuses on data collected from interviews 
with multiple people at the Fighter Engine System Program Office (SPO), PW and 
GEAE.  The thesis covers the period from the early 1980s to 1988 and the beginnings of 
the Improved Performance Engine program that resulted in the F100-PW-229 and F110-
GE-129 motors.  The primary research question addressed in the thesis is: How has the 
competition between PW and GEAE for the AFE developed and has it been successful?  
Her study finds the key benefits from the competition to have been better responsiveness 
from the contractor (PW), more reliable engines, better and cheaper warranties, lower 
engine cost, and a broader industrial base (Mayes, 1988). 
 Mayes’ work does not address any of the concerns about non-compatibility 
between the two motors, and only briefly discusses any of the logistical concerns of 
having two parallel supply chains for a similar item.  Specifically, she states,  
There has been some reluctance to accept this concept from Air Force 
Logistics Command (AFLC). This is due to the inherent logistics 
problems of introducing two systems into the inventory along with the 
duplication of support equipment, spare and repair parts, and technical 
orders. Although this makes the logistics process more complex, the 
AFLC community has found it to be workable (Mayes, 1988). 
D. MILITARY JET ENGINE ACQUISITION: TECHNOLOGY BASICS AND 
COST-ESTIMATING METHODOLOGY 
 Several RAND studies detail cost methodology and spending assessments across 
the full range of support of both the F-16 aircraft and its engine systems.  A 2002 study, 
Military Jet Engine Acquisition: Technology Basics and Cost-Estimating Methodology, 
provides a thorough history of jet engine development, a highly readable overview of the 
workings of a jet engine, and discussion of cost estimation techniques used throughout 
the work.  The report provides a statistical analysis of “performance, programmatic, and 
technology parameters that affect development and production costs and development 
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schedules of engines” (Younossi et al., 2002).  Overall, the study found there to be “little 
or no evidence” that the GEAE and PW engine competition resulted in any net savings in 
total research and development and procurement costs.  The key benefits cited from the 
competition were the acquisition of “better-performing, more-reliable, and more-
maintainable engines from more-responsive contractors” (Younossi et al., 2002). 
E. STATEMENTS OF LOUIS CHÊNEVERT, SCOTT C. DONNELLY, 
GORDON ENGLAND, AND JAMES M. GUYETTE BEFORE THE 
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE 
 On March 15, 2006, representatives from GEAE, PW, and DoD testified before 
the Senate’s Committee on Armed Services in relation to DoD’s decision to cancel the 
JSF’s alternate engine program for the FY2007 budget.  Unsurprisingly, they offered 
differing views on the benefits of engine competition. 
 Mr. Louis Chênevert, President and Chief Operating Officer of PW’s parent 
company, United Technologies Corporation, claimed DoD’s decision to cancel the 
alternate engine program is “…operationally and economically, a sound and secure one” 
(Chenevert, 2006).  He supported his claim with evidence of testing success and the 
success of the F135 engine used in the F-22, upon which much of the F136 engine is 
based, to counter any claims of risk associated with sole-source procurement.  As further 
evidence of his assertion, he noted there are no backup or alternate engines for numerous 
DoD aircraft including the GEAE and Rolls-Royce-powered F-18s, Black Hawks, V-22s, 
or C-130s, nor is there for PW-powered F-22s or C-17s.  He stated limited funding and 
improved reliability and performance of modern engines eliminate the need for dual-
sourcing (Chenevert, 2006). 
 Mr. Chênevert tackled the industrial base benefit argument by asserting “…there 
is no such thing as the fighter engine business per se--just the engine 
business…engineering and manufacturing workforce can readily move from commercial 
programs to military programs and vice-versa, as can the supply base” (Chenevert, 2006).  
General Electric and Rolls-Royce, he claimed, have more than adequate fighter engine  
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business to maintain required skills and infrastructure through sole-source contracts for 
the F-18, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters, C-130J cargo aircraft, and the V-22 tilt 
rotor (Chenevert, 2006). 
 Mr. Scott C. Donnelly, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of GE 
Aviation, and Mr. James M. Guyette, President and CEO of Rolls-Royce North America, 
testifying jointly, offered a contrasting view of the competition.  They recounted the 
success of the “Great Engine War” and extrapolate its benefits directly to future benefits 
for the F-35 Program, including “…reduced operational risks, better performance, 
increased readiness, enhanced contractor responsiveness, lower costs, etc…” (Donnelly 
& Guyette, 2006). 
 In their testimony they claimed the F-35 Program is unique in defense 
procurement and presents a compelling need for competition at both the business and 
operational cases.  Specific to the business case, Donnelly and Guyette posited the 
competition for engine procurement and spare parts support will easily offset the 
increased cost of dual-source procurement.  And, competition provides the warfighter 
“…less risk, better performance, higher readiness, more technology infusion, (and) 
enhanced contractor responsiveness…” (Donnelly & Guyette, 2006). 
 Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England’s testimony, buttressed by 
the presence of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, 
sought to defend the DoD’s cancellation of funding for the alternate engine.  He claimed 
the DoD thoroughly studied the pros and cons of competition and concluded it would not 
yield net cost savings.  Furthermore, Secretary England asserted while competition 
reduces failure risk associated with sole-source procurement, the reliability and proven 
technology of the F135 engine make this an acceptable risk (England, 2006). 
 In regards to the Great Engine War, Secretary England noted the AFE 
competition did serve a valuable purpose at its time, but its successes cannot be directly 
extrapolated to future engine procurement efforts.  He provided the F-18E/F and F-22 
sole-source programs as evidence of modest and acceptable risks associated with sole- 
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source procurement.  In light of the continued success of the F-22’s F119 engine and the 
approximately 70% commonality between the F119 and F135 engines, sole-source risk 
was further mitigated (England, 2006). 
 Secretary England closed his testimony with an analysis of “Hard Choices” made 
by the Bush Administration and DoD leading to the cancellation of the alternate engine.  
Arguing alternate engine funding could be more effectively spent on other more pressing 
needs within the DoD, Secretary England stated, “As a general matter, applying resources 
to a specific problem is usually more timely and effective than diverting funding to a 
redundant solution” (England, 2006) 
F. PROPOSED TERMINATION OF JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER F136 
ALTERNATE ENGINE 
 An April 2006 Congressional Research Service report, Proposed Termination of 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, provides a brief review of the original 
Great Engine War and its relationship to the current debate over the controversy 
surrounding DoD efforts to terminate the JSF’s alternate engine contract with GEAE in 
the FY2007 budget.  The report rejects assertions of little to no cost savings from the F-
16 Great Engine War.  To rebut these assertions, the report cites statements made by 
senior Air Force officials indicating the Air Force saved over 20% of total costs over the 
20-year life cycle following competition, compared to only operating “legacy F100 
engines.”  Additionally, the report takes issue with the assumptions and cost 
methodologies both the DoD and PW analysts use to claim a lack of cost savings in the 
F-16 engine program (Bolkcom, Library of Congress, & Congressional Research Service, 
2006).   
G. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: DOD’S CANCELLATION OF THE JOINT 
STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE PROGRAM WAS NOT 
BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 
 A May 2006 GAO brief, Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint 
Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis, 
investigated DoD’s rationale and supporting analysis for cancelling the JSF’s alternate 
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engine.  The report asserts the DoD “…relied on selective elements of two prior studies 
done in 1998 and 2002” and failed to focus on true life cycle costs and potential benefits 
competition might provide over the life cycle of the engines (Sullivan, 2006). 
H. ANALYSIS OF COSTS FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ENGINE 
PROGRAM 
 In March 2007 Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management for the GAO, issued a follow-up to Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation 
of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a 
Comprehensive Analysis with his testimony to the House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces.  His testimony, titled Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter 
Engine Program, presented a strong case for the multiple long-term benefits of engine 
competition for the F-35 Program. 
 By way of background, the report relates the history of engine competition, or 
lack thereof, for the JSF dates to FY1996 when Congress “…first expressed concern over 
the lack of engine competition in the JSF program…” (Sullivan, 2007).  In FY1998, 
Congress mandated DoD allocate sufficient funding for development of an alternate 
engine, resulting in the GEAE F136.  Based on this direction, the DoD commissioned 
multiple studies to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the engine competition.  
Successive studies by DoD program management advisory groups in 1998 and 2002 
recommended maintaining an alternate engine program.  Among the benefits identified 
by both of these groups were “…contractor responsiveness, industrial base, aircraft 
readiness, and international participation…” with “…marginal benefits in the areas of 
cost savings and ability to add future engine improvements” (Sullivan, 2007). 
 Mr. Sullivan stated that while an alternate engine procurement program will in 
fact cost “…significantly more than a sole-source program” (Sullivan, 2007), the 
competition is expected to reduce long-term costs and provide other significant benefits.  
Specifically, the “associated competitive pressures” (Sullivan, 2007) from the alternate 
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engine program are expected to mitigate any additional costs associated with multiple 
source procurement.  He also claimed that past experience from engine competitions, 
such as the AFE for the F-16, generated financial benefits of approximately 21 percent 
over the program’s life cycle and realized additional benefits of improved quality and 
other benefits.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume possible savings of 10.3 to 12.3 
percent, the offset required to recoup the additional cost from multiple source 
procurement.  Further, Mr. Sullivan related,  
…DoD-commissioned reports and other officials have said that 
nonfinancial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, 
improved industrial base stability, and more responsive contractors are 
more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-
source strategy. 
The potential for cost savings and performance improvements, along with 
the impact the engine program could have on the industrial base, 
underscores the importance and long-term implications of DoD decision 
making with regard to the final acquisition strategy solution (Sullivan, 
2007). 
The actual savings are dependent on the structure of the competition between PW and 
GEAE, the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor, and the total number of JSFs 
procured (Sullivan, 2007). 
 Additional benefits of competition identified by Mr. Sullivan are risk reduction 
and viability of industrial base.  He noted competition will “reduce the risk that a single 
point, systematic failure in the engine design could substantially affect the fighter aircraft 
fleet” (Sullivan, 2007).  Competition also has significant long-term impact on industrial 
base.  Joint Strike Fighter engine production and support is expected to generate 
requirements through 2060.  If GEAE is not guaranteed access to at least a portion of this 
business (in light of PW’s control of sole-source production for the F-22 and the 
declining production of engines by GEAE for the F-18E/F), it is likely GEAE would shift 




could result in a significant erosion of future capabilities and the potential for future 




IV. SAVINGS FOREGONE 
A. OVERVIEW 
 The intent of this MBA Project was not to calculate an exact dollar figure for the 
savings foregone in the decision not to make the F110 and F100 engines “common” in 
their F-16 application.  The intent was to construct a model and detail a methodology that 
can be used to show how the application of an open architecture via commonality of two 
functionally equivalent, high-dollar items could have reduced logistics life cycle costs 
over the multi-decade time horizon of their operational use.  The methodology used 
below to create a model for commonality cost savings analysis can be modified and 
applied to any similar situation.  It is the authors’ hope the applicability is fairly broad, 
going well beyond the next fighter engine acquisition, and provides a baseline model 
from which to start when forecasting future requirements or making decisions on future 
acquisitions of high-dollar yet field-replaceable consumable or reparable components.   
 The two decades of history of the F100 and F110 engines as used in the F-16 
provide a reasonable volume of data over a significant length of time.  Thus the F100 and 
F110 data from the F-16 were used to build the commonality model.  Engine removal 
data from FYs 2001 through 2007 were the inputs to the model.  This data was obtained 
from the USAF’s AFMC (A. Singleton, personal communication, October 22, 2007).  A 
complete listing of locations used in the study and key information parameters for each 
location is available at Appendix L. 
 Assumptions made in the process of building the model are listed in the text at the 
time of their first use in the creation of the model.  Wherever possible, the assumptions 
made were conservative and err to the side of less savings.  Stated another way, as the 
input data fidelity improves, the savings calculation output from the model should grow. 
B. SAVINGS? 
 The first assumption is implied by the first word of the title of this chapter, 
“Savings.”  The authors were vigilant to continue to permit the option that the actual 
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“savings” may, in fact, be negative.  Negative savings is synonymous with a cost increase 
and is a possible outcome of the model. 
 The basis of the “savings” assumption is that commonality of F100 and F110 
engines would enable stock consolidation of the RFI supplies feeding flightline 
maintainers servicing F-16 aircraft “holes.”  As discussed previously, in a stochastic 
demand environment where demand is normally distributed, pooled stock will always 
have a lower inventory than distributed stock.  This statement of statistical theory rests on 
the fact that the standard deviation of pooled demand is the square root of the sum of the 
variances of the distributed demand (see Section II.B.). 
C. COMMONALITY 
 The next assumption was that it was possible for the USAF to require the F110 
engine to be “common” with the F100 F-16 airframes.  This would enable a flightline 
maintenance team to remove an F100 engine from the airframe and replace it with either 
an F100 engine or an F110 engine.  Conversely, the hole created by the removal of an 
F110 engine could be replaced with either another F110 engine or an F100 engine.   
 Is this a realistic assumption?  At the time the USAF officially decided to 
purchase the F110 under the AFE competition, GEAE already had its F101X engine in 
flight test (Drewes, 1987).  Therefore, the requirement for the F110 to be compatible with 
an F-16 built for an F100 engine would have certainly delayed the initial operational 
capability of the F110 and increased development costs.  However, had GEAE known 
before F101X development and testing the USAF was likely to require “commonality” 
with the F100, it is probably the costs and delays of commonality could have been 
dramatically reduced and possibly eliminated.  The authors did not pursue the technical 
and financial feasibility of this commonality and do not see great value in it being 
pursued as future research.  If the development costs of a “common” F110 engine were 
determined, those costs could then be combined with the output of the model developed 
in this MBA Project to determine the net potential cost savings from engine commonality 
in F100 and F110 equipped F-16 aircraft.  The output of the model developed in this 
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MBA Project provides an upper dollar limit on the investment that could have been made 
in commonality without increasing the total life cycle cost.  
 The authors contend it is very reasonable to require commonality between 
multiple vendors of a high-dollar, technologically advanced component of a system if the 
requirement for commonality is established at the onset of the system acquisition process, 
i.e., no later than the specification of the component interfaces during the functional 
breakdown of the system as a part of a systems engineering process (SEP).  This is a 
classic example of open systems architecture as discussed in Section II.A.  For a detailed 
discussion on this phase of an SEP, refer to Blanchard and Fabrycky’s Systems 
Engineering and Analysis (Blanchard & Fabrycky, Chapters 4 and 5).  Another excellent 
reference for SEP is Chapter 4 of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(https://akss.dau.mil/dag/).  Testament to the validity of this commonality assertion is the 
required commonality of the F135 and F136 engines for the F-35 (Department of 
Defense, 2007a). 
D. F-16 BASES AND ENGINE DEMAND 
 United States Air Force data for FY2006 gives the locations of both F100-PW-
220 and F110-GE-100 powered USAF F-16 CONUS aircraft bases (J. Estes, personal 
communication, May 30, 2007).  The authors chose the FY2006 F-16 force structure as a 
baseline for this MBA Project.  See Sections IV.F. and IV.G. below for maps displaying 
their locations.  The locations listed include operational AD, ANG, and AFR locations. 
 Air Force Materiel Command data gave the annual number of engine removals in 
FY2001 through FY2007 for each location in this MBA Project.  The authors were not 
able to obtain or reproduce overall reliability and maintainability metrics for F100 and 
F110 engines (B. Eberhard, personal communication, August 29, 2007).  However, the 
historical engine removal data do show demand placed against each base’s inventory of 
spare engines.  The authors assumed the variability in demand during FY2001 through 
FY2007 was due to the stochastic nature of the demand and not to any other factors.  This 
is a large assumption.  However, recall that the intent of this MBA Project is to develop a 
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model to forecast commonality savings.  Since the intent was not to calculate the exact 
savings foregone by the F-16 program this assumption does not water-down the output of 
the model created with the methodology detailed in this MBA Project.  Based on this 
assumption, the mean for each location was used as the expected demand.  Standard 
deviations and variance of demand were also calculated from the same FY2001 through 
FY2007 engine removal data set.    
 The data collected for analysis consist only of F-16 F100-PW-220 and F110-GE-
100 engine information for USAF ACC and AETC CONUS-based AD, ANG, and AFR 
organizations.  This limitation was necessary due to the unavailability of data on a larger 
scale.  Inclusion of additional locations and commands using the F100 and F110 has the 
potential to increase the commonality savings.  
E. STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 Without stock consolidation, no savings from commonality occur as each location 
retains their same inventory levels.  Therefore, to compare the inventory including safety 
stock before and after the commonality assumption is applied to the F100 and F110, the 
current F100 and F110 inventories must first be consolidated. 
 In a physical consolidation system for fighter engines, it is logical for active duty 
locations to support ANG/AFR locations.  Based on issues discussed in Section II.H., it is 
not realistic for ANG/AFR locations to support an active duty flying location.  However, 
since the schedules and operations constraints are similar within the ANG/AFR, it is 
logical for ANG and AFR locations to support each other. 
 Since the USAF typically ships F100 and F110 engines within CONUS via air 
ride-equipped tractor-trailers, it is not reasonable to expect a unit in need of an engine to 
wait the multiple days’ drive time to receive the engine from one central CONUS 
location, even a centrally located one like Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.  Forcing a CONUS 
consolidation at only one location will not survive in the face of the operational realities.  
However, it is reasonable to assume one calendar day is an acceptable wait for a 
replacement engine.  It is also reasonable to assume an engine can be transported 500 
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statute miles (sm) in a 24 hour period (C. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 
2007).  Therefore, the authors estimated 500sm as an approximation of an operationally 
acceptable distance from the customer F-16 unit needing the engine to the corresponding 
inventory at the consolidation location.  The authors used a 500sm radius around bases 
when determining where to locate the physical consolidated inventory and designate a 
location as a consolidation location.  It is important to note this is a 500sm radius or “as 
the crow flies,” and not actual road driving distances.  The 500sm “bubble” requirement 
makes multiple stock consolidation locations a requirement.    
 Note that many of the locations designated as consolidation locations also have a 
demand for engines.  These locations are both the consolidation location (supplier) and 
the customer location.  This distinction is necessary for the methodology used in this 
MBA Project. 
 All driving distances used in this model were derived from the Defense Table of 
Official Distances (DTOD), available at https://dtod.sddc.army.mil (authorized users are 
required to establish an account with login and password).  The DTOD is the  
…official source for worldwide distance information used by the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  DTOD provides vehicular land distances 
for all DoD household goods, all DoD freight, and PCS/TDY travel needs. 
It generates point-to-point distances and routes for origin/destination pairs 
of locations. The DTOD website’s distance calculation and mapping 
functions provide road segment and cumulative distances over the network 
of truck-usable highways and roads in North America, South America, 
Europe, Africa, Oceania, and Asia (Department of Defense, 2007c). 
 The central supply location for F100 and F110 engines is Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.  
Physical consolidation requires a high service level be applied for the supply of spare 
engines from the consolidation locations to the customer bases that have lost their local 
spare engine inventories.  The authors assumed the service level from the consolidated 
locations to the customer location bases to be 99.0%.  This number is reasonable, as the 
tolerance for “back orders” at a base without an engine inventory is extremely low.  
Changes in this protection level do not compromise the savings from commonality as 
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long as the protection level remains consistent throughout the model both before and after 
commonality.  And, the notion of base operating without a supply of spare engines is 
consistent with current USAF initiatives (see Section II.H.). 
 Data detailing the exact lead times for delivery of engines from the central supply 
location at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, were not available to the authors.  Additionally, the 
detailed methodology used by the USAF in determining authorized stock levels of 
engines is beyond the scope of this project.  Refer to Section II.H. for more background.   
The authors assume approximately four days of lead time are required for all 
administrative, financial processing, and shipment preparation tasks at the central 
location (Tinker AFB, Oklahoma) and the consolidation location (L. Gatti, personal 
communication, October 5, 2007).  This four day lead time is combined with the drive 
time to determine the lead time required for a consolidation location to receive an order 
from the central location.  The authors continue to assume 500sm is the distance that can 
be driven in a day.  Dividing the DTOD distances from Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, to the 
consolidation locations by 500sm and rounding up to the next whole number results in 
the drive time in days.  Drive time and processing lead time combine to form the total 
lead time.   The consolidation locations need inventories with appropriate safety stock 
levels to provide engines to their customer locations over the lead time. 
 If a faster mode of transportation were to make a single consolidation point a 
viable alternative, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma (home of the Oklahoma City ALC (OC-
ALC)), would be a logical choice.  It correlates relatively well to the COG theory 
recommended location (see Appendix E).  Oklahoma City ALC is also the focal point of 
the F100 and F110 supply chain.  Further research on this topic, specifically focused on 
the USAF Supply Chain Management of F100 and F110 engines, is beyond the scope of 
this MBA Project.  
 Also, note the synergistic capabilities of a virtual stock consolidation (such as the 
USAF MICAP system described in Section II.H.) may result in a lower total inventory 
than a physical consolidation.  However, virtual consolidation is a much more complex 
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Supply Chain Management problem than is needed to answer the commonality question 
that is the heart of this MBA Project.  Therefore, virtual consolidation was not pursued in 
this project.  However, the authors highly recommend virtual consolidation of F100 and 
F110 engines are pursued in future research activities. 
 The authors do not assert their selections of physical consolidation locations were 
optimum, merely that their selections were logical, reasonable, and functional.  Optimum 
physical stock consolidation was not a subject of this MBA Project, nor is it a 
prerequisite to the analysis of the potential savings due to commonality.  The two main 
items in consolidation required to analyze the commonality assumption are (1) 
consolidation must occur before commonality can reduce total inventory and (2) as long 
as the inputs to the non-common consolidation and the commonality consolidation are the 
same, the result of commonality will have validity.   
F. F100 STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 The figure below depicts the 14 locations the USAF kept an inventory of F100 
engines in FY2006.   
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Figure 13 – F100-PW-220 Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
 
Figure Key: 
1.  Tinker AFB, OK 2.  Hill AFB, UT 3.  Fresno, CA 
4.  Nellis AFB, NV 5.  Luke AFB, AZ 6.  Tucson, AZ 
7.  Tulsa, OK 8.  Houston, TX 9.  Ft. Smith, AR 
10. Des Moines, IA 11. Duluth, MN 12. Ft. Wayne, IN 
13. Toledo, OH 14. Burlington, VT 
 
These 14 locations are distributed among 12 states – as far west as California, 
north as Minnesota, east as Vermont, and south as Texas.  The 14 F100 locations include 
two AD F-16 flying bases – Luke AFB, Arizona, and Nellis AFB, Nevada.  The third AD 
location on the map, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, does not have any assigned F-16 aircraft.  
Therefore, the model assumes Tinker AFB has no inventory to directly feed to flightline 
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maintenance efforts.  However, OC-ALC is AFMC’s largest of three ALCs and has F100 
engines in various stocks.  Oklahoma City ALC’s 448 Combat Sustainment Wing 
provides “…Supply chain management, including acquisition, repair, storage, 
distribution, disposal and the technical and engineering services for the center’s assigned 
engines…”, which include the F100 and F110 engines (72nd Air Base Wing Public 
Affairs, 2007).  The model assumes the stocks of engines at Tinker AFB are all depot 
level and, therefore, not applicable for inclusion in the model.  Additionally, the F-16 
depot-level maintenance at Hill AFB, Utah, removed F100 engines in FY2001 through 
FY2007.  Recall that the model assumes the removal of a motor from an F-16 is 
synonymous with demand for a motor.  The other 10 locations are ANG/AFR F-16 flying 
organizations. 
 The three stock consolidation locations used in the assumed physical 
consolidation of the F100 engines were: 
- Luke AFB, Arizona 
- Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 
- The Ohio ANG operating location at Toledo Express Airport near Toledo, Ohio 
 These locations are termed “consolidation locations.”  All three of these locations 
receive engines from OC-ALC.  These three locations were selected based on the Ardalan 
Model results modified by a “does this make sense” filter (see Appendix F).  The filtering 
process was based primarily on the authors’ professional experience in F-16 operations, 
maintenance, and supply chain realities current as of 20063. 
 Luke AFB, Arizona, is the world’s largest fighter wing and has the single largest 
F-16 operation in the world (56th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, 2007).  All AD and AFR  
 
 
                                                 
3 Many of the decisions made on consolidation were based on the authors’ operational experience as a 
Maintenance Officer of an F-16 Aircraft Maintenance Unit (Henderson) and as an Operational and 
Developmental Test Pilot of F-16 aircraft (Higer). 
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aircraft at Luke AFB use the F100 motor.  In addition to supplying engines to its co-
located AD and AFR F-16 operations, the consolidation point at Luke AFB would 
support the operations at: 
- Nellis AFB, Nevada 
- F-16 aircraft depot requirements at Ogden ALC (OO-ALC) at Hill AFB, Utah 
- ANG operations in Fresno, California 
- ANG operations at Tucson International Airport in Arizona   
Luke AFB, Nellis AFB, OO-ALC at Hill AFB, Fresno, and Tucson are the 
“customer” locations for the consolidation at Luke AFB.   
 Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, has a constant flow of F100 motors through its depot 
maintenance and it therefore makes sense for it to have a permanent need for engine 
inventory.  As a consolidation location it would support the following “customers”:  
- ANG operations at Ellington Field near Houston, Texas 
- ANG operations in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
- ANG operations at Ft. Smith, Arkansas 
- ANG operations in Des Moines, Iowa 
 The Ohio ANG operation near Toledo is centrally located among the remaining 
four F100 locations.  As the third F100 consolidation location it would support its own 
ANG customer operation and support customer locations at the three other ANG 
operations: 
- Ft. Wayne, Indiana 
- Duluth, Minnesota 
- Burlington, Vermont 
 The results of the F100 stock consolidation are displayed in Appendix G.  Note 
the total required number of engines in inventory is 45 after consolidation. 
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 The assumptions used in the commonality calculation are displayed in the upper 
left corner of the figure in Appendix G and repeated below. 
- Cost Per Engine:  $3,113,722 2006 dollars was the average of the AFMC-
assigned value of an F100 and F110 engine as listed in the OC-ALC/LR Engine 
Handbook (D. Horn, personal communication, October 22, 2007). 
- Protection Level:  The protection level or service level of engines from the 
consolidation location to its customer locations. 
- Stochastic Distribution:  Normal. 
- Processing Lead Time:  The administrative time required to ship and receive an 
engine from the central location (OC-ALC at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma) to the 
consolidation location.  It does not include transportation time. 
- Transportation Costs:  The $2.50 per mile rate was based on a personal 
communication with Mr. Curtis Smith of ACC’s Transportation Division (USAF).  
This cost per mile is the standard value used by USAF planners for air ride-
equipped trailers. 
- Demand Unit Of Time:  This number was included in the model as a way to 
rapidly adjust the model for demand data that changed.  As displayed in this MBA 
Project, “365” in this cell corresponds to demand data for a calendar year.  If the 
demand data were per month, the cell entry would be “30.” Demand data input 
into the model created by this MBA Project were annual data.  This number is 
used in the calculations within the model. 
- Facilitate Other MX Rate:  The assumed percentage of engine removals that 
will not require a replacement engine from inventory.  Removals for this reason 
would not generate demand for an engine from the inventory.  MX is an 
abbreviation for maintenance.  Facilitate Other MX is abbreviated FOM. 
- Demand Multiplier:  This is a multiplicative factor used to adjust the demand for 
all customer locations.  A factor of 1.00 corresponds to no change in the demand 
from the source data.  A factor of 2.00 would correspond to a doubling of the 
demand from the source data while a factor of 0.50 would half the demand from 
the source data.  This factor was used for sensitivity analysis.   
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The calculations and other information across the bottom of the spreadsheet from 
left to right are as follows: 
- Location:  The name used throughout this MBA Project to describe the physical 
location. 
- ICAO:  The three alphanumeric character designation of the airfield.  ICAO is the 
acronym for the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
- Expected Removals Per Year:  The mean value of FY2001 through FY2007 
actual F-16 engine removals for the corresponding location. 
- σYear:  The standard deviation of FY2001 through FY2007 actual F-16 engine 
removals for the corresponding location.   
- Demand (Engines per Year):  Information in this column results from the 
reduction of Expected Removals Per Year by the percentage of engines removed 
for FOM activities.  This column displays the demand for engines from the spare 
engine inventories in the calculations that follow.  It is calculated by rounding up 
the results of the following equation: 
Demand = (1 – Facilitate Other MX Rate) * Expected Removals Per Year 
- Miles From Tinker AFB:  The DTOD distance from the central engine facility 
(OC-ALC) at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, to the consolidation locations.  If the cell is 
blank, then the corresponding location is not a consolidation location.  Notice that 
Tinker AFB is a consolidation location and the central engine facility.  This was 
input into the model by listing the miles “from” Tinker AFB “to” the 
consolidation location at Tinker AFB as zero.    
- Drive Time (Days):  The information displayed in this column was calculated by 
dividing the Miles From Tinker AFB by 500.0 and then rounding up.  As an 
example, 500 miles would be one driving day, but 500.1 miles would be two 
driving days.  
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- Supply LT (Days):  The lead time (LT) for the supply pipeline of engines from 
the central location at Tinker AFB to the consolidated stock location.  It is the 
sum of the Drive Time (Days) and the Processing Lead Time. 
- DLT Engines: This value is the demand over Supply LT (Days).  Values in this 
column were calculated based on the location’s function.  If the corresponding 
location was a consolidation point, then the value in the cell is the sum of the 
customer DLT Engines values listed in the rows immediately below.  The DLT 
Engines for customer locations were calculated by multiplying the Demand 
(Engines per Year) values by the Supply LT (Days) and then dividing by the 
Demand Unit Of Time.  As an example, Nellis AFB, Nevada, had a DLT Engines 
value of 1.233 which is (6 / 365 =) 0.0164 times the Demand (Engines per Year) 
for the customer location. 
- Z:  This number is the statistical Z-value of the Protection Level. 
- σLT Engines:  This value is the standard deviation of demand over Supply LT 
(Days).  Values in this column were calculated based on the location’s function.  
If the corresponding location was a consolidation point, then the value in the cell 
is the square root of the sum of the variances of the customer σLT Engines values 
listed in the rows immediately below.  The σLT Engines for customer locations 
were calculated by multiplying the variance of annual demand values by an 
adjustment factor.  This adjustment factor was the square root of the square of the 
Supply LT (Days) divided by the square of the Demand Unit Of Time.  The result 
was the variance of demand over supply lead time.  The σLT Engines values 
displayed are the square root of variance over supply lead time.  This seemingly 
complex calculation was required because standard deviations are not additive, 
but variance (which is the square of the standard deviation) is additive. 
- Inventoryi Engines:  For consolidation locations this is the required inventory to 
fulfill demand from all customer locations.  It is calculated by adding the expected 
demand over the Supply LT (DLT Engines ) to the safety stock.  The safety stock 
was calculated by multiplying the Z value by the standard deviation over Supply 
LT (σLT Engines).  The values in this column for the customer locations were 
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calculated in the same manner, but are displayed only as reference.  The 
Inventoryi Engines values do not carry forward in the model. 
- Consolidation Location Inventory:  The total inventory at the consolidation 
location that was calculated by rounding up the value for the corresponding 
Inventoryi Engines value to the next integer. 
- Distance From Consolidation:  The DTOD-determined distances from the 
consolidation location to the customer locations in actual driving (freight) miles. 
- Annual Transportation Costs:  The cost of transporting engines from the 
consolidation location to the customer locations.  It was calculated through 
multiplying the Distance From Consolidation by the Transportation Cost (in $ per 
mile).  Values in this column are the additional transportation costs due to the 
consolidation of the inventories from all the customer locations into a larger 
inventory at the consolidation location. 
G. F110 STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 The hypothetical consolidation of the F110 inventories was accomplished in a 
parallel manner with the F100 method described above.  Identical details between the 
F100 and F110 consolidations are not repeated in this section. 
 The figure below depicts the 19 locations the USAF kept an inventory of F110 
engines in FY2006.   
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Figure 14 – F110-GE-100 Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
 
Figure Key: 
1.  Tinker AFB, OK 2.  Hill AFB, UT 3.  Great Falls, MT 
4.  Albuquerque, NM 5.  Denver, CO 6.  Cannon AFB, NM 
7.  San Antonio, TX 8.  Ft Worth, TX 9.  Sioux Falls, SD 
10. Springfield, IL 11. Madison, WI 12. Montgomery, AL 
13. Springfield, OH 14. Selfridge, MI 15. Homestead, FL 
16. Richmond, VA 17. Andrews AFB, MD 18. Syracuse, NY 
19. Atlantic City, NJ 
These locations are distributed among 17 states – as far west as Utah, north as 
Montana, east as New York, and south as Florida.  The 19 F110 locations include two 
AD F-16 flying bases – Hill AFB, Utah, and Cannon AFB, New Mexico.  Tinker AFB, 
Oklahoma, is again included in the list for the same reasons mentioned previously.  The  
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fourth AD location with F110 engines in FY2006 was Andrews AFB, Maryland, home to 
an ANG F-16 operation.  The other 15 locations are ANG/AFR F-16 flying 
organizations. 
 The stock consolidation locations used in the assumed physical consolidation of 
the F110 engines were: 
- Hill AFB, Utah 
- Tinker AFB, Oklahoma  
- Andrews AFB, Maryland 
- The Illinois ANG operations located at Capital Airport in Springfield, Illinois 
 Hill AFB, Utah, has three AD F-16 squadrons, an AFR squadron, and is home to 
the ALC responsible for F-16 depot-level maintenance.  In addition to support for co-
located customer operations, the physical consolidation at Hill AFB would also support a 
customer location at the ANG operations in Great Falls, Montana. 
 Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, has a constant flow of F110 engines and components 
through its depot maintenance and it therefore makes sense for it to have a permanent 
need for inventory.  As a consolidation point it would support: 
- Cannon AFB, New Mexico 
- ANG operations near San Antonio, Texas 
- AFR operations in Ft Worth, Texas 
- ANG operations in Albuquerque, New Mexico 
- ANG operations in Denver, Colorado 
- ANG operations near Montgomery, Alabama 
- AFR operations at Homestead, Florida 
 While Denver is approximately 80 miles closer to Hill AFB, Utah, than Tinker 
AFB, Oklahoma, Denver can be more reliably supported by Tinker AFB due to overall 
distance traveled (Tinker AFB to Denver versus Tinker AFB to Hill AFB to Denver) and 
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the extreme winter weather and topography between Hill AFB and Denver.  The ANG 
operations in Alabama and Florida are approximately 275 and 950 miles outside the 
500sm bubble.  Therefore, they would likely need some additional considerations to 
provide the same service level as the operating locations within 500sm of Tinker AFB, 
Oklahoma.  Exactly what these adjustments should be are beyond the scope of this MBA 
Project.  These two locations are treated identically in the pre- and post-commonality 
calculations.  This assumption was applied consistently throughout this MBA Project 
and, therefore, should not affect the results of the analysis.  
 The AD consolidation location at Andrews AFB, Maryland, would support the 
following customers: 
- ANG operations at Andrews AFB, Maryland 
- ANG operations in Richmond, Virginia 
- AFR operations near Atlantic City, New Jersey 
- ANG operations near Syracuse, New York 
 The Illinois ANG operation in Springfield, Illinois, is centrally located among the 
remaining five “Northern Tier” F110 locations.  In addition to supplying itself as a 
customer location, it would also support:  
- ANG operations in Madison, Wisconsin 
- ANG operations in Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
- ANG operations near Selfridge, Michigan 
- ANG operations near Springfield, Ohio 
 The results of the F110 stock consolidation are displayed in Appendix H.  Note 




H. PRE-COMMONALITY CONSOLIDATION RESULTS 
 The departure point for the potential savings due to F100 and F110 commonality 
is the combined consolidated inventory levels (including safety stocks) for both the F100 
and F110 engines.  This total is (45 + 46 =) 91 engines. 
I. COMMONALITY CONSOLIDATION 
 Application of the F100 and F110 commonality assumption opens the door to a 
third physical stock consolidation calculation.  This third consolidation combined the 
demands of both the F100 and the F110 customer locations.  This hypothetical 
consolidation of the F100 and F110 inventories was accomplished in a parallel manner 
with the F100 method described above.  Identical details are not repeated in this section. 
 The stock consolidation locations – assuming F100 and F110 commonality – 
would be: 
- Hill AFB, Utah 
- Luke AFB, Arizona 
- Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 
- Andrews AFB, Maryland 
- The Illinois ANG operating location in Springfield, Illinois 
In addition to the selection factors discussed previously, the selection of these 
consolidation locations was influenced by the authors’ attempts to minimize the changes 
in inventory size and location from the baseline F100 and F110 consolidation models. 
 In the commonality consolidation model, the physical consolidation of F100 and 
F110 engines at Hill AFB, Utah, supports the co-located F-16 operations and the ANG 
operations at Great Falls, Montana.  This is the same support plan described in the F110 
Consolidation section above. 
 The physical consolidation at Luke AFB, Arizona, with the removal of support to 
F-16 aircraft depot operations at Hill AFB, Utah, supports the same locations and 
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operations under the commonality consolidation as it did in the F100 consolidation.  The 
consolidation point at Luke AFB would support its co-located AD and AFR operations 
and support the following customer locations:  
- Nellis AFB, Nevada 
- ANG operations in Fresno, California 
- ANG operations at Tucson International Airport in Arizona   
 Operations supported by Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, in the commonality 
consolidation model are the combined locations supported by Tinker in the F100 and 
F110 consolidation models.  A commonality consolidation inventory at Tinker would 
support: 
- Cannon AFB, New Mexico 
- ANG operations at Ft. Smith, Arkansas 
- ANG operations in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
- ANG operations in Des Moines, Iowa 
- ANG operations at Ellington Field near Houston, Texas 
- ANG operations near San Antonio, Texas 
- AFR operations in Ft. Worth, Texas 
- ANG operations in Albuquerque, New Mexico 
- ANG operations in Denver, Colorado 
- ANG operations near Montgomery, Alabama 
- AFR operations at Homestead, Florida 
As noted in the F110 consolidation discussion above, assumptions about 
transportation times to the ANG operations in Alabama and Florida were applied 
consistently both before and after the commonality assumption.  
 The Illinois ANG operation in Springfield is centrally located among eight 
“Northern Tier” F-16 ANG/AFR locations.  In addition to supporting its own operations, 
it would also support: 
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- ANG operations in Madison, Wisconsin 
- ANG operations in Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
- ANG operations near Springfield, Ohio  
- ANG operations near Selfridge, Michigan 
- ANG operations near Toledo, Ohio 
- ANG operations at Ft. Wayne, Indiana  
- ANG operations near Duluth, Minnesota 
 In the commonality consolidation Andrews AFB, Maryland, would support:  
- ANG operations at Andrews AFB, Maryland 
- ANG operations in Richmond, Virginia 
- AFR operations near Atlantic City, New Jersey 
- ANG operations near Syracuse, New York 
- ANG operations in Burlington, Vermont 
 The results of the commonality stock consolidation are at Appendix I.  The 
assumptions in the upper left corner of Appendix I are consistently applied to the F100, 
F110 and the commonality consolidations.  Also, the consolidation locations used in the 
commonality consolidation are a sub-set of the consolidation locations for the F100 and 
F110 consolidations performed above.  This removes potential variability in the savings 
calculations due to a change in a consolidation location.  Additionally, the assumed 
supply lead times for an engine shipment from Tinker AFB to the consolidation locations 
were held constant during the application of the commonality assumption.  This removes 
another source of potential variability in the savings calculations.   
The results for the commonality calculation are displayed in the upper right corner 
of the spreadsheet. 
- Reduced Inventory:  The calculated reduction in engines held in inventory due 
to commonality.  It is the sum of the pre-commonality consolidation location 
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inventory levels for the F100 and F110 minus the sum of the commonality 
consolidation location inventory levels.     
- Inventory Reduction:  The reduction in inventory carrying costs per year due to 
the consolidation calculated by the following equation: 
Inventory Reduction = Reduced Inventory * Cost Per Engine 
- Transportation Savings:  The reduction in transportation costs due to the 
commonality assumption.  It is the sum of the pre-commonality consolidation 
Annual Transportation Costs for the F100 and F110 minus the commonality 
consolidation Annual Transportation Costs. 
 The total number of engines required moves from 91 before the commonality 
assumption is applied to 83 after the commonality of F100 and F110 engines is assumed.  
Commonality also reduced the transportation costs, relative to the consolidated pre-
commonality consolidation, by approximately $95,000 per year.  Again, to foot stomp, 
these were the reductions in inventory and transportation costs due to commonality. 
J. ENGINES TO DOLLARS 
 As discussed in the background section, the USAF continuously procures “whole” 
engines for its aircraft.  This places an engine in a “consumable” pool and not an asset 
pool in which the F-16 airframes would be located or assigned.  This leads directly to the 
conclusion that the reduced number of engines in inventory will not have to be 
“purchased” at a later date.  Therefore, the value to the USAF of the eight fewer F100 
and/or F110 engines in inventory due to commonality is simply the price of an engine 
multiplied by the number of engines not needed in inventory.  As demonstrated in the 
model and discussed above, additional savings from commonality via reduced 
transportation costs are also possible.   
 This annual savings can then be converted to a life-cycle cost savings through a 
fairly basic present value (PV or Net PV (NPV)) calculation.  The authors chose to 
consider only the portion of the F-16 life cycle from the fielding of the first F110 
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(FY1987) through and including FY2006.  The potential savings forecast for FY2007 and 
beyond would require significant assumptions on the timing and manner in which the    
F-16 fleet is eventually retired and/or replaced.  Therefore, the historical 20 year look is 
the perspective taken by the authors.   
 The PV Calculations are provided at Appendix J.  The only major assumption 
required for the NPV calculation is the selection of an appropriate historical discount rate.  
OMB Circular A-94 has historical real and nominal Treasury rates for three, five, seven, 
ten and thirty years for the calendar years of interest in the MBA Project.  The real rates 
for the years under study are replicated in the right-most five columns of data in the 
spreadsheet for reference.  The 30-year rates were selected, as it is very realistic to 
assume the programs under study (F-16, F100, F110) would have been expected to be in 
the inventory for more than 20 years (Office of Management and Budget, 2007). 
 Moving from left to right, the columns in the spreadsheet at Appendix J are: 
- Year:  The calendar year. 
- Inventory Reduction:  The value calculated in the commonality consolidation 
and discussed above in Section IV.I. 
- Cost of Capital:  The historical real rate for an appropriate length Treasury.  In 
this model it is the 30-year real rate. 
- Inventory Savings:  The reduction in the carrying cost of the engine inventory 
each year calculated by the following equation: 
Inventory Savings = Inventory Reduction * Cost of Capital 
- Transportation Savings:  The value calculated in the commonality consolidation 
and discussed above in Section IV.I. 
- Discount Factor:  The factor used to convert a specific calendar year’s value into 
an appropriate value for another year.  This is not an adjustment due to inflation, 
as all rates in this MBA Project are real interest rates.  This adjustment accounts  
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for the real growth of funds over time by the selected Treasury rate.  As an 
example, a real dollar in 1987 would grow to approximately $2.09 (real dollars) 
by 2006. 
- PV:  This is the present value in calendar year 2006 of the Inventory Savings and 
Transportation Savings.  This column was then summed to create the NPV of 
Commonality Decision in 2006 Dollars.   
The logistics savings foregone by not requiring the F110 to be “plug-n-play” with an 
F100 configured F-16 was calculated to be approximately $31.8M.  This equates to the 
value of approximately 10.2 engines in FY2006. 
K.   SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The authors performed a limited sensitivity analysis on the model developed for 
this MBA Project (see Appendix K).  Appendix K summarizes the changes to the output 
of the model as a single input assumption is changed. 
There was a very strong correlation between the percentage change in cost of an 
engine to the percentage change in the savings due to commonality.  This was due to the 
construction of the model where the savings is first calculated in units of engines and 
then this value is converted to dollars via the multiplication of the value of an engine. 
The percentage change in savings appears to move in the same direction as the 
percentage change in transportation costs.  However, the magnitude of the output change 
is dramatically lower than the magnitude of the input.  The model appears to be very 
tolerant of transportation cost changes.  This is logical, as the transportation costs do not 
affect the volume of engines in inventory or the demand for engines.  Additionally, the 
savings from the reduction in engine inventory due to commonality is magnitudes larger 
than the savings from transportation efficiencies due to commonality. 
Changes in the savings calculated by the model appear to vary inversely and with 
a much smaller magnitude than changes to the Facilitate Other MX Rate.  This is logical 
as a decrease in the FOM rate is synonymous with an increase in demand. 
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Changes in the demand (via changes in the demand multiplier), changes in the 
processing lead time, and changes in the protection level all appear to have higher order 
effects on the output of the model.  No simple and general statement can be made about 
their relationship.  The authors are confident the somewhat random nature of the changes 
in the output of the model due to very systematic changes to these three inputs is due to 
the small integer values of the reduced number of engines due to commonality and the 
rounding up requirement placed on the inventories for parts.  Further research into the 
exact cause and effect relationships would be required for any definitive and detailed 
conclusion.  However, the savings due to commonality remains positive through all the 
single variable perturbations of these three inputs.  The savings goes as low as $13.6M 
and as high as $43.7M. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Did the decision to field non-common F100 and F110 engines cost the USAF the 
$31.8 million dollars calculated by the model generated for this MBA Project?  No.  This 
figure does not include the additional up-front costs of making the F110 engine common 
with the F100 built F-16 airframes.  The authors have no data from which to estimate the 
cost of this forced commonality.  Even if the forced commonality of the F110 to the F100 
interfaces was physically possible (likely), the political realities of the early 1980s may 
have made the commonality of the two engines practically impossible (see Drewes’ The 
Air Force and the Great Engine War). 
 The intent of this MBA Project was to use historical data to build a model that 
calculates potential life-cycle cost savings due to the commonality of high-dollar, 
complex and “consumable” items.  It is the utmost hope of the authors that this work will 
be of value to future decision-makers in the heat of the “do I force commonality” 
analysis.  The model is not just specifically for F-16 or other fighter engines.  In fact, it 
should be quite simple to modify the input data and verify (or better yet eliminate) the 
assumptions for virtually any item that is a high-cost consumable or reparable.  The 
imagined applicability ranges from the F135 and F136 debate underway to future 
procurements of engines for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or Unmanned Combat 
Aerial Vehicles (UCAV).  That is not to say this model applies only to aircraft engines 
either.  Any high dollar consumable or reparable item, such as a composite propeller for a 
UAV/UCAV can be analyzed in this manner as well. 
The savings due to commonality would have been relatively small when 
compared to the F-16, F100, and F110 program costs over the same 20 year period 
analyzed by this MBA Project.  The direct correlation of savings and cost per engine 
uncovered via sensitivity analysis points to a significant commonality savings potential 
for items that are significantly more expensive but procured in approximately the same 
quantities as the F100 and F110 engines.  The same correlation between demand and 
savings was not supported by sensitivity analysis.  
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The value of the methodology used in this MBA Project to future decision makers 
will be the creation of an upper limit for up-front and other non-recurring costs required 
to make parts “common.”  As an example, the cost savings through commonality of the 
F100 and F110 engines for the F-16 calculated by the model development in this MBA 
Project provides a reasonable upper limit for the expenditure of resources in pursuit of 
commonality.  Had the estimated cost of commonality for the F100 and F110 been 
approximately $10.0M, the model calculations show the logistics life cycle cost 
avoidance would have offset this program expense by approximately a 3:1 ratio.  
Conversely, if the estimated costs of the F100 and F110 commonality had been $100.0M, 
the model calculations show the logistics life cycle cost avoidance would not have been 
able to offset the additional costs of commonality and therefore if commonality were 






A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ACC  Air Combat Command 
AD  Active Duty 
AETC  Air Education and Training Command 
AFB  Air Force Base 
AFE  Alternate Fighter Engine 
AFI  Air Force Instruction 
AFLC  Air Force Logistics Command 
AFMC  Air Force Materiel Command 
AFR  Air Force Reserve 
ALC  Air Logistics Center 
ANG  Air National Guard 
BPR  By-Pass Ratio 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
COG  Center(s) of Gravity 
CONUS Continental United States 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DTOD  Defense Table of Official Distances 
FMS  Foreign Military Sales 
FOM  Facilitate Other Maintenance 
FY  Fiscal Year 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GE  General Electric 
GEAE  General Electric Aviation Engines 
GMC  General Motors Corporation 
HQ  Headquarters 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
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JSF  Joint Strike Fighter 
LT  Lead Time 
MBA  Master of Business Administration 
MICAP Mission Capable 
MX  Maintenance 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OA  Open Architecture 
OC-ALC Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OO-ALC Ogden Air Logistics Center 
OSJTF  Open Systems Joint Task Force 
PCS  Permanent Change of Station 
PRS  Propulsion Requirements System 
PW  Pratt & Whitney 
PV  Present Value 
RFI  Ready for Issue 
ROP  Reorder Point 
RPM  Revolutions Per Minute 
SEP  Systems Engineering Process 
SER  Scheduled Engine Removal 
SM  Statute Mile 
SPO  System(s) Program Office 
STOVL Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing 
TDY  Temporary Duty 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV  Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
UER  Unscheduled Engine Removal 
USAF  United States Air Force 
USN  United States Navy 
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B. BASIC INVENTORY MANAGEMENT THEORIES MATHEMATICAL 
NOTATION 
 
Fixed-Order Quantity, Continuous Review Inventory Model 
 




Safety Stock is the authorized value of inventory at a location specifically set aside to 
protect from stock-out during the lead time of ordering more stock.   
 
Z = Z value corresponding to the probabilistic value from the cumulative standard normal 
distribution. 
 
σLT is the standard deviation of demand over the lead time.  It is equal to the square root 
of the variance of demand over lead time.   
 
DLT is the average or expected value of demand during the lead time of the order.  It can 
be calculated in many ways.  Below is but one example: 
 
DLT = DAnnual * LT / 365 Days    
 
LT is a shorthand notation for lead time. 
 
 
If the safety stock level, annual expected demand, protection level, and standard 
deviation of demand are known, the lead time for orders can be approximated.  A 










C. F-16 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Primary Function: Multirole fighter  
Builder: Lockheed Martin Corporation  
Power Plant: F-16C/D: one Pratt and Whitney F100-PW-220/229 or General 
Electric F110-GE-100/129  
Thrust: F-16C/D, 27,000 pounds (approximately) 
Length: 49 feet, 5 inches (14.8 meters)  
Height: 16 feet (4.8 meters)  
Wingspan: 32 feet, 8 inches (9.8 meters)  
Speed: 1,500 mph (Mach 2 at altitude)  
Ceiling: Above 50,000 feet (15 kilometers)  
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 37,500 pounds (16,875 kilograms)  
Range: More than 2,000 miles ferry range (1,740 nautical miles)  
Armament: One M-61A1 20mm multibarrel cannon with 500 rounds; external 
stations can carry up to six air-to-air missiles, conventional air-to-air and air-to-
surface munitions and electronic countermeasure pods  
Unit cost: F-16A/B , $14.6 million (FY1998 constant dollars); F-16C/D, $18.8 
million (FY1998 constant dollars)  
Crew: F-16C, one; F-16D, one or two  
Date Deployed: January 1979 
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D. JET ENGINE BASICS 
This section is taken from Younossi, Arena, Moore, Lorell, Mason, and Graser’s 
2002 RAND Report Military Jet Engine Acquisition: Technology Basics and Cost-
Estimating Methodology, pages 9 -14. 
 
Jet engines operate on what thermodynamicists know as the Brayton cycle. The 
Brayton cycle consists of three distinct stages: compression (raising the pressure of the 
air entering an engine), heating (raising the temperature of the air to increase its energy 
greatly), and expansion (allowing the pressure of the flowing air and fuel combustion 
products to drop in order to extract energy and accelerate the flow).4  While variations in 
hardware design and complexity exist, these three stages are normally achieved in jet 
engines by using the following processes: 
 
The pressure of the air entering an engine is raised as the air is initially slowed by 
the engine’s inlet5 and as it flows through the engine’s compressor. Next, heating occurs 
in a combustor, where fuel is burned with the high-pressure air. Finally, expansion occurs 
as energy is extracted from the exhaust gases by a turbine. These gases accelerate 
through the engine’s nozzle to produce thrust. The turbine extracts power from high-
pressure and high-temperature combustion products (much like a windmill extracts 
energy from wind) to drive (turn) the rotating compressor. A small percentage of the 
turbine’s power is also drawn off to run auxiliary systems, such as the oil pump, fuel 
pump, hydraulic pump, and alternator. 
 
A jet engine produces thrust by making a net change in the velocity of the air that 
is moving through the engine. In the words of Sir Isaac Newton, for every action there is 
an equal and opposite reaction. As the engine “pushes” on the air to accelerate it, the air 
                                                 
4 More specifically, and from a theoretical perspective, the Brayton cycle consists of adiabatic compression of the working fluid 
(raising the pressure of the air, without external heating or cooling), heating the working fluid at a constant pressure, and adiabatic 
expansion of the working fluid (allowing the pressure to drop without external heating or cooling). 
5 Inlets slow the incoming air at most flight conditions. However, when the aircraft is parked with the engines running or is flying 
very slowly, the engine is actually accelerating the air as it sucks it into the inlet. 
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pushes back on the engine, providing thrust for the aircraft. This effect is illustrated by 
the basic thrust equation: 
 
Thrust = mdot * (Vout – Vin) 
 
where, mdot is the rate at which air moves through the engine (kilograms [kg]/second), 
Vout (meters/second) is the velocity of the flow leaving the exhaust nozzle (i.e., the flow’s 
velocity relative to the nozzle), and Vin is the velocity of the air as it approaches the 
engine (which is also the aircraft’s true airspeed).6 
 
A turbojet is a basic jet engine that integrates the five primary components 
mentioned earlier (inlet, compressor, combustor, turbine, and nozzle). Some turbojets 
include a second combustor after the turbine, called an afterburner (or augmentor). The 
afterburner adds energy to the turbine discharge flow to maximize the thrust from the 
engine. The afterburner is usually engaged only when the maximum thrust is required 
because the fuel efficiency of a jet engine drops by a factor of three or four when the 
afterburner is at its maximum setting. Most early jet engines were turbojets. However, 
with some exceptions, such as some small and relatively inexpensive turbojets designed 
for one-time-use missile applications, modern jet engines have evolved into more-
complicated devices called turbofan engines. A turbofan engine is more complex and 
more efficient than a turbojet. 
 
A turbofan adds a second compressor, called a fan, a low-pressure turbine to 
drive the fan, and an annular-shaped bypass duct that allows part of the fan’s discharge 
air to flow around the high-pressure compressor, combustor, and both turbines. The fan 
compresses air, much like the high-pressure compressor, and some of the air leaving the 
fan enters the high-pressure compressor, while the remainder flows through the bypass 
duct. This bypass air is eventually accelerated through a nozzle to produce thrust. 
 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, these velocities are measured relative to a reference frame attached to the aircraft. 
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The figure on the next page is a cutaway drawing of a Pratt & Whitney (PW) 
F100-PW-220 afterburning turbofan. The fan, high-pressure compressor, combustor, 
high-pressure turbine, low-pressure turbine, bypass duct, afterburner, and nozzle are 
labeled. (The inlet is not shown because each tactical aircraft would have a different inlet 
design.) The combination of high-pressure compressor, combustor, and high-pressure 
turbine is known as an engine’s core. 
 
In afterburning turbofans, the portion of the fan’s air that passes through the 
bypass duct is remixed with the core’s combustion products in the afterburner, before the 
mixture is accelerated through the nozzle. When maximum or near maximum thrust is 
necessary, the afterburner injects additional fuel into these flows as they are mixing, and 
then burns this air-fuel mixture before it reaches the nozzle. Due to fuel efficiency (flight 
duration and range) considerations, the afterburner is used only for takeoff and when 
maximum acceleration is needed for a short period of time. In fact, the F-22’s 
afterburning turbofan (Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100) is powerful enough to allow this 
aircraft to supercruise (fly supersonically without afterburning). 
 
Turbofans are the only engines on military fighter aircraft that are equipped with 
afterburners. Most of the engines flying on modern commercial airliners and similar 
wide-body and military aircraft are high-bypass-ratio (BPR) turbofans and do not use 





Figure 16 – Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220 Afterburning Turbofan 
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Therefore, a high-BPR turbofan engine has a relatively large diameter fan, which 
handles much more air than the high-pressure compressor it precedes. These high-BPR 
turbofans are significantly more fuel-efficient than turbojets or low-BPR turbofans. This 
increased efficiency makes the added size and complexity of a large fan and 
corresponding low-pressure turbine cost effective for many applications.7 On the other 
hand, high-BPR turbofans have large diameters and relatively low thrust-to-weight ratios, 
requiring large nacelles on wings or large ducts through fuselages. This is incompatible 
with aircraft designed for supersonic flight due to the high drag and weight implications. 
Instead, fighter engines are typically designed with low BPRs (typically 0.3 to 0.8) to 
strike a balance between engine efficiency, diameter, and weight.  
 
Turboprop and turboshaft engines also operate on variations of the Brayton cycle. 
These engines have cores similar to turbojet and turbofan cores. In addition, they 
typically have a low-pressure turbine that extracts most of the remaining available energy 
from the combustion products after they leave the core. This low-pressure turbine turns a 
shaft, which is not connected to a fan or compressor. Instead, this shaft is used to drive a 
propeller (turboprop) or a helicopter rotor (turboshaft).8 Intuitively, it may be helpful to 
think of a turboprop as a turbofan with an extraordinarily large bypass ratio but without a 
nacelle around the propeller to form the bypass duct. At times, the visible presence of a  
 
 
                                                 
7 It is instructive to understand why a turbofan (especially a high-BPR turbofan) improves fuel 
efficiency. This is best understood by considering the definitions of kinetic energy (kinetic energy = mV2) 
and momentum (momentum = mV) in the light of the thrust equation presented earlier. In these definitions, 
m is the mass of a moving object and V is its velocity. When fuel is burned to heat the air flowing through a 
jet engine, it increases the flow’s internal energy, which is partially converted to kinetic energy in the 
engine’s nozzle. Depending upon the bypass ratio of an engine design, a given change in kinetic energy can 
take the form of a small mass of air undergoing a large increase in V2, or a large mass undergoing a small 
increase in V2. However, as the thrust equation reveals, thrust is produced in proportion to the change in 
velocity through the engine, not the change in velocity squared (in other words, thrust increases in 
proportion to the increase in momentum [mV] rather than the increase in kinetic energy [mV2]). When the 
fuel’s energy is used to create a very large V2, the thrust increases only by the square root of this increase 
(V). Therefore, it is most efficient to accelerate a large amount of air by a small increase in velocity, 
leading engine manufacturers to design turbofans with a high BPR, if practical for the aircraft’s mission. 
8 Turboshafts are also used to drive other devices, such as the M-1 tank, Navy ships, and Brayton cycle 
power plants. 
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propeller or rotor leads some to incorrectly assume that these aircraft are powered by 
internal combustion engines like early propeller-driven aircraft, rather than by these 
forms of jet engines. 
 
Like the turbofan or turbojet, these engines have a nozzle downstream of the low-
pressure turbine, and the flow exiting this nozzle typically produces some thrust. 
However, the low-pressure turbine extracts so much of the flow’s energy before it 
reaches the nozzle that the main propulsive effect is achieved by the propeller or 
helicopter rotor, rather than by the flow exiting this nozzle. Virtually all turboprop and 
turboshaft engines employ highly efficient gearboxes to reduce the power shaft’s 
rotational speed to an RPM appropriate for the propeller, rotor, and other engine 
components (Younossi et al., 2002). 
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E. CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATION 
 This section provides the results of stockage locations using the COG Method.  
The COG Method requires a fair amount of subjective interpretations of map locations 
and “best” location given the data produced by the COG equation.  Accordingly, the 
authors readily acknowledge others may select different locations given the same data.  
The maps and placement of USAF and COG-selected locations are derived from the 
United States Department of the Interior’s National Atlas of the United States 
(Department of the Interior, 2007) and engine demand from USAF’s AFMC (B. 
Eberhard, personal communication, August 29, 2007). 
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 The results of COG calculations prior to any consolidation or commonality are as 
follows: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Albuquerque 36 55 38 1368 2090
Andrews 62 148 29 1798 4292
Atlantic City* 64 156 20 1280 3120
Burlington 87 156 31 2697 4836
Cannon 32 64 97 3104 6208
Denver 53 59 28 1484 1652
Des Moines 62 96 25 1550 2400
Duluth 82 97 27 2214 2619
Fresno 45 12 34 1530 408
Ft Smith 38 95 29 1102 2755
Ft Wayne 63 122 28 1764 3416
Ft Worth 24 83 25 600 2075
Great Falls 86 47 53 4558 2491
Hill 58 38 297 17226 11286
Homestead 4 149 25 100 3725
Houston 14 92 33 462 3036
Luke 32 33 273 8736 9009
Madison 67 109 25 1675 2725
Montgomery 25 124 44 1100 5456
Nellis 45 26 66 2970 1716
Richmond 54 147 25 1350 3675
San Antonio 12 79 49 588 3871
Selfridge 69 128 43 2967 5504
Sioux Falls 68 86 44 2992 3784
Springfield, IL 55 110 31 1705 3410
Springfield, OH 58 127 53 3074 6731
Syracuse 76 146 33 2508 4818
Tinker 37 84 1 37 84
Toledo 65 127 18 1170 2286
Tucson 24 39 102 2448 3978
Tulsa 39 89 18 702 1602
C sub x 46.75
C sub y 69.99  
Figure 17 – COG Calculations for Single Distribution Center 
 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
This location, as identified in the figure below, best corresponds to Goodland, Kansas: 
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CoG Results:  Single Distribution Center








Figure 18 – COG Calculations Results for All Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
 Based on the 500sm criteria established in Section IV.E. above, the authors 
subjectively grouped locations, first by engine type (i.e., either GEAE or PW).  The 
determined groupings, with AD locations identified by base name and ANG/AFR 
locations identified by place or city name are as follows: 
F100-PW-220 Groupings 
A:  Fresno, Hill (depot), Luke, Nellis, Tucson 
B:  Des Moines, Ft. Smith, Houston, Tinker, Tulsa 
C:  Burlington, Duluth, Ft. Wayne, Toledo 
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F110-GE-100 Groupings 
A:  Great Falls, Hill (operational) 
B:  Albuquerque, Cannon, Denver, Ft. Worth, Homestead, Montgomery, San Antonio, 
Tinker 
C:  Madison, Selfridge, Springfield (IL), Springfield (OH), Sioux Falls 
D:  Atlantic City, Andrews, Richmond, Syracuse 
 
The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for PW 
Group A: 
 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Luke 32 33 273 8736 9009
Nellis 45 26 66 2970 1716
Hill (depot) 58 38 67 3886 2546
Fresno 45 12 34 1530 408
Tucson 24 39 102 2448 3978
C sub x 36.11
C sub y 32.58  
Figure 19 – COG Calculations for Group A F100-PW-220 Locations 
The COG-selected location is the Greater Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area. 
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The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for PW 
Group B: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Tinker 37 84 1 37 84
Ft Smith 38 95 29 1102 2755
Tulsa 39 89 18 702 1602
Des Moines 62 96 25 1550 2400
Houston 14 92 33 462 3036
C sub x 36.35
C sub y 93.18  
Figure 20 – COG Calculations for Group B F100-PW-220 Locations 
The COG-selected location is Muskogee, Oklahoma. 
The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for PW 
Group C: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Toledo 65 127 18 1170 2286
Ft Wayne 63 122 28 1764 3416
Duluth 82 97 27 2214 2619
Burlington 87 156 31 2697 4836
C sub x 75.43
C sub y 126.51  
Figure 21 – COG Calculations for Group C F100-PW-220 Locations 
The COG-selected location is Saginaw, Michigan. 
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The following map shows the placement of COG method-selected locations in 













CoG Results:  F100PW220 Locations
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Figure 22 – COG Calculations Results for F100-PW-220 Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
 
Figure Key: 
1.  Tinker AFB, OK 2.  Hill AFB, UT 3.  Fresno, CA 
4.  Nellis AFB, NV 5.  Luke AFB, NM 6.  Tucson, AZ 
7.  Tulsa, OK 8.  Ellington, TX 9.  Ft. Smith, AR 
10. Des Moines, IA 11. Duluth, MN 12. Ft. Wayne, IN 
13. Toledo, OH 14. Burlington, VT 




The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for 
GEAE Group A: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Hill 58 38 230 13340 8740
Great Falls 86 47 53 4558 2491
C sub x 63.24
C sub y 39.69  
Figure 23 – COG Calculations for Group A F110-GE-100 Locations 
The COG-selected location is Tremonton, Utah. 
The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for 
GEAE Group B: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Tinker 37 84 1 37 84
San Antonio 12 79 49 588 3871
Cannon 32 64 97 3104 6208
Albuquerque 36 55 38 1368 2090
Ft Worth 24 83 25 600 2075
Montgomery 25 124 44 1100 5456
Homestead 4 149 25 100 3725
Denver 53 59 28 1484 1652
C sub x 27.30
C sub y 81.96  
Figure 24 – COG Calculations for Group B F110-GE-100 Locations 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
The COG-selected location is Denton, Texas. 
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The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for 
GEAE Group C: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Springfield, IL 55 110 31 1705 3410
Madison 67 109 25 1675 2725
Sioux Falls 68 86 44 2992 3784
Springfield, OH 58 127 53 3074 6731
Selfridge 69 128 43 2967 5504
C sub x 63.33
C sub y 113.03  
Figure 25 – COG Calculations for Group C F110-GE-100 Locations 
The COG-selected location is west of the Chicago metropolitan area, Illinois. 
The following chart shows the results of the COGs Method calculations for 
GEAE Group D: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Andrews 62 148 29 1798 4292
Richmond 54 147 25 1350 3675
Atlantic City* 64 156 20 1280 3120
Syracuse 76 146 33 2508 4818
C sub x 64.82
C sub y 148.64
* Atlantic City is converting from the F100 to the F110 engine--FY06 demand 
is for F100-PW-220s  
Figure 26 – COG Calculations for Group D F110-GE-100 Locations 
The COG-selected location is Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
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The following map shows the placement of COG method-selected locations in 




















CoG Results:  F110GE100 Locations











Figure 27 – COG Calculations Results for F110-GE-100 Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
  
Figure Key: 
1.  Tinker AFB, OK 2.  Hill AFB, UT 3.  Great Falls, MT 
4.  Albuquerque, NM 5.  Denver, CO 6.  Cannon AFB, NM 
7.  San Antonio, TX 8.  Ft. Worth, TX 9.  Sioux Falls, SD 
10. Springfield, IL 11. Madison, WI 12. Montgomery, AL 
13. Springfield, OH 14. Selfridge, MI 15. Homestead, FL 
16. Richmond, VA 17. Andrews AFB, MD 18. Syracuse, NY 
19. Atlantic City, NJ 
 
A:  Tremonton, UT  B:  Denton, TX 
C:  West of the Chicago metropolitan area D:  Harrisburg, PA 
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 With commonality and the 500sm criteria established in Section IV.E. above, the 
determined groupings, with AD locations identified by base name and ANG/AFR 
locations identified by place or city name are as follows: 
Commonality Groupings 
A:  Great Falls, Hill 
B:  Fresno, Luke, Nellis, Tucson 
C:  Albuquerque, Cannon, Des Moines, Denver, Ft. Smith, Ft. Worth, Homestead, 
Houston, Montgomery, San Antonio, Tinker, Tulsa 
D:  Duluth, Ft. Wayne, Madison, Selfridge, Springfield (IL), Springfield (OH), Sioux 
Falls, Toledo 
E:  Andrews, Atlantic City, Richmond, Syracuse, Burlington 
 The following chart shows the results of the COG Method calculations for 
Commonality Group A: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Hill 58 38 297 17226 11286
Great Falls 86 47 53 4558 2491
C sub x 62.24
C sub y 39.36  
Figure 28 – COG Calculations for Group A Commonality Locations 
 
These values are a slight modification from the GEAE Group A values:  the 
inclusion of Hill AFB’s depot demand for F100 removals moves the COG-selected 
location closer to Hill AFB, Utah.  The COG-selected location is Brigham City, Utah. 
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 The following chart shows the results of the COG Method calculations for 
Commonality Group B: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Fresno 45 12 34 1530 408
Luke 32 33 273 8736 9009
Nellis 45 26 66 2970 1716
Tucson 24 39 102 2448 3978
C sub x 33.02
C sub y 31.81  
Figure 29 – COG Calculations for Group B Commonality Locations 
The COG-selected location is Blythe, Arizona. 
 The following chart shows the results of the COG Method calculations for 
Commonality Group C: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Albuquerque 36 55 38 1368 2090
Cannon 32 64 97 3104 6208
Denver 53 59 28 1484 1652
Des Moines 62 96 25 1550 2400
Ft Smith 38 95 29 1102 2755
Ft Worth 24 83 25 600 2075
Homestead 4 149 25 100 3725
Houston 14 92 33 462 3036
Montgomery 25 124 44 1100 5456
San Antonio 12 79 49 588 3871
Tinker 37 84 1 37 84
Tulsa 39 89 18 702 1602
C sub x 29.60
C sub y 84.84  
Figure 30 – COG Calculations for Group C Commonality Locations 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
The COG-selected location is Ardmore, Oklahoma. 
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 The following chart shows the results of the COG Method calculations for 
Commonality Group D: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Duluth 82 97 27 2214 2619
Ft Wayne 63 122 28 1764 3416
Madison 67 109 25 1675 2725
Selfridge 69 128 43 2967 5504
Sioux Falls 68 86 44 2992 3784
Springfield, IL 55 110 31 1705 3410
Springfield, OH 58 127 53 3074 6731
Syracuse 76 146 33 2508 4818
Toledo 65 127 18 1170 2286
C sub x 66.45
C sub y 116.86  
Figure 31 – COG Calculations for Group D Commonality Locations 
The COG-selected location is Gary, Indiana. 
 The following chart shows the results of the COG Method calculations for 
Commonality Group E: 
X Y DEMAND X * Dmd Y * Dmd
Andrews 62 148 29 1798 4292
Atlantic City* 64 156 20 1280 3120
Burlington 87 156 31 2697 4836
Richmond 54 147 25 1350 3675
Syracuse 76 146 33 2508 4818
C sub x 69.80
C sub y 150.30
* Atlantic City is converting from the F100 to the F110 engine--FY06 
demand is for F100-PW-220s  
Figure 32 – COG Calculations for Group E Commonality Locations 
The COG-selected location is Scranton, Pennsylvania 
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 The following map shows the placement of COG method-selected locations with 
commonality: 
CoG Results:  Commonality













Figure 33 – COG Calculations Results for Commonality Locations 
Source:  www.nationalatlas.gov/  10/2007 
 
Figure Key: 
A.  Brigham City, UT B.  Blythe, AZ C.  Ardmore, OK 
D.  Gary, IN E.  Scranton, PA 
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F. ARDALAN METHOD CALCULATION 
 This section provides mathematical validation of the authors’ choice of stockage 
locations using the Ardalan Method.  The distances used are derived from DTOD, engine 
demand from USAF’s AFMC (B. Eberhard, personal communication, August 29, 2007). 
 Based on the 500sm criteria established in Section IV.E. above, the authors 
subjectively grouped locations, first by engine type (i.e., either GEAE or PW).  The 
determined groupings, with AD locations identified by base name and ANG/AFR 
locations identified by place or city name are as follows: 
F100-PW-220 Groupings 
A:  Fresno, Hill (depot), Luke, Nellis, Tucson 
B:  Des Moines, Ft. Smith, Houston, Tinker, Tulsa 
C:  Burlington, Duluth, Ft. Wayne, Toledo 
F110-GE-100 Groupings 
A:  Great Falls, Hill (operational) 
B:  Albuquerque, Cannon, Denver, Ft. Worth, Homestead, Montgomery, San Antonio, 
Tinker 
C:  Madison, Selfridge, Springfield (IL), Springfield (OH), Sioux Falls 
D:  Atlantic City, Andrews, Richmond, Syracuse 




FROM Luke Nellis Hill (depot) Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke 0 302 684.5 575.1 144.7 273 1
Nellis 302 0 436.6 399.7 436.1 66 1
Hill (depot) 684.5 436.6 0 837.2 800.1 67 1
Fresno 575.1 399.7 837.2 0 709.3 34 1
Tucson 144.7 436.1 800.1 709.3 0 102 1
FROM Luke Nellis Hill (depot) Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke -              82,446.00    186,868.50  157,002.30  39,503.10    273 1
Nellis 82,446.00    -              119,191.80  109,118.10  119,055.30  66 1
Hill (depot) 186,868.50  119,191.80  -              228,555.60  218,427.30  67 1
Fresno 157,002.30  109,118.10  228,555.60 -            193,638.90 34 1
Tucson 39,503.10    119,055.30  218,427.30 193,638.90 -             102 1




Figure 34 – Ardalan Calculations for Group A F100-PW-220 Locations 
The Ardalan Method employs a weighted priority for locations used within the 
model.  Without manipulating the weighted priorities, Nellis AFB is the Ardalan-selected 
location.  However, Nellis AFB is over 150 miles more distant from Tinker AFB than 
Luke AFB and the significantly higher demand at Luke AFB warrant consideration for 
weighted priority.  Accordingly, a slight modification of priority using entirely subjective 
inputs yields the following: 
FROM Luke Nellis Hill (depot) Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke 0 302 684.5 575.1 144.7 273 1.2
Nellis 302 0 436.6 399.7 436.1 66 0.8
Hill (depot) 684.5 436.6 0 837.2 800.1 67 0.8
Fresno 575.1 399.7 837.2 0 709.3 34 0.7
Tucson 144.7 436.1 800.1 709.3 0 102 0.7
FROM Luke Nellis Hill (depot) Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke -              98,935.20    224,242.20  188,402.76  47,403.72    273 1.2
Nellis 65,956.80    -              95,353.44    87,294.48    95,244.24    66 0.8
Hill (depot) 149,494.80  95,353.44    -            182,844.48 174,741.84 67 0.8
Fresno 109,901.61  76,382.67    159,988.92  -              135,547.23  34 0.7
Tucson 27,652.17    83,338.71    152,899.11 135,547.23 -             102 0.7




Figure 35 – Weighted Ardalan Calculations for Group A F100-PW-220 Locations 
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Note the Ardalan Method-selected location is the location with the lowest sum of 
values (identified in bold font), in this example, Luke AFB. 
 Calculations for PW Group B locations are problematic due to the lack of engine 
demand at Tinker AFB (no assigned F-16 aircraft).  However, Tinker AFB’s role as the 
F100 and F110 repair depot makes it a logical, subjective choice for a distribution center.  
The results of the Ardalan calculations for PW Group B locations are as follows: 
FROM Tinker Ft Smith Tulsa Houston DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker 0 179.4 117 458.9 1 1
Ft Smith 179.4 0 120.9 463.5 29 1
Tulsa 117 120.9 0 513.7 18 1
Des Moines 539.1 469.8 427.7 926.5 25 1
Houston 458.9 463.5 513.7 0 33 1
FROM Tinker Ft Smith Tulsa Houston DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker -              179.40         117.00         458.90         1 1
Ft Smith 5,202.60      -              3,506.10      13,441.50    29 1
Tulsa 2,106.00      2,176.20      -              9,246.60      18 1
Des Moines 13,477.50    11,745.00    10,692.50    23,162.50    25 1
Houston 15,143.70    15,295.50    16,952.10  -            33 1




Figure 36 – Ardalan Calculations for Group B F100-PW-220 Locations 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
 
Ft. Smith is the Ardalan-selected location; however, the authors selected Tinker 
AFB as the distribution center based on its role as engine repair and overhaul depot. 
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 Calculations for PW Group C locations are as follows: 
FROM Toledo Ft Wayne Duluth Burlington DEMAND WEIGHT
Toledo 0 98.6 681.2 679 18 1
Ft Wayne 98.6 0 636.1 768.3 28 1
Duluth 681.2 636.1 0 1366.6 27 1
Burlington 679 768.4 1366.6 0 31 1
FROM Toledo Ft Wayne Duluth Burlington DEMAND WEIGHT
Toledo -              1,774.80      12,261.60  12,222.00  18 1
Ft Wayne 2,760.80      -              17,810.80    21,512.40    28 1
Duluth 18,392.40    17,174.70    -              36,898.20    27 1
Burlington 21,049.00    23,820.40    42,364.60  -            31 1




Figure 37 – Ardalan Calculations for Group C F100-PW-220 Locations 
Toledo is the Ardalan-selected location and the authors’ preferred location. 
 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
GEAE Group A: 
FROM Hill Great Falls DEMAND WEIGHT
Hill 0 533.3 230 1
Great Falls 533.3 0 53 1
FROM Hill Great Falls DEMAND WEIGHT
Hill 0 122659 230 1
Great Falls 28264.9 0 53 1




Figure 38 – Ardalan Calculations for Group A F110-GE-100 Locations 
Hill AFB is the obvious Ardalan-selected location and the preferred location 
based on its significantly greater demand and proximity to Tinker AFB. 
 As identified for PW Group B, calculations for GEAE Group B locations are 
problematic due to the lack of engine demand at Tinker AFB (no assigned F-16 aircraft).  
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However, Tinker AFB’s role as the F100 and F110 repair depot makes it a logical, 
subjective choice for a distribution center.  The results of the Ardalan calculations for 
GEAE Group B locations are as follows: 
FROM Tinker San Antonio Cannon Albuquerque Ft Worth Montgomery Homestead Denver DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker 0 470.4 368.8 546.8 193.5 777.4 1456.6 605.2 1 1
San Antonio 470.4 0 495.2 712.2 281.4 832.6 1389.9 922.4 49 1
Cannon 368.8 495.2 0 217.1 399.6 1073.3 1761.5 454.3 97 1
Albuquerque 546.8 712.2 217.1 0 608.6 1292.6 1980.8 421.1 38 1
Ft Worth 193.5 281.4 399.6 608.6 0 675.4 1364 736.2 25 1
Montgomery 777.4 832.6 1073.3 1292.6 675.4 0 684 1343.3 44 1
Homestead 1456.6 1389.9 1761.5 1980.8 1364 683 0 2022.5 25 1
Denver 605.2 922.4 454.3 421.1 736.2 1343.3 2022.5 0 28 1
FROM Tinker San Antonio Cannon Albuquerque Ft Worth Montgomery Homestead Denver DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker -                    470.40          368.80           546.80                193.50         777.40           1,456.60      605.20         1 1
San Antonio 23,049.60         -                24,264.80      34,897.80         13,788.60  40,797.40    68,105.10  45,197.60    49 1
Cannon 35,773.60         48,034.40     -                21,058.70         38,761.20  104,110.10  170,865.50 44,067.10    97 1
Albuquerque 20,778.40         27,063.60     8,249.80        -                      23,126.80    49,118.80      75,270.40    16,001.80    38 1
Ft Worth 4,837.50           7,035.00       9,990.00        15,215.00           -              16,885.00      34,100.00    18,405.00    25 1
Montgomery 34,205.60         36,634.40     47,225.20      56,874.40           29,717.60    -                30,096.00    59,105.20    44 1
Homestead 36,415.00         34,747.50     44,037.50      49,520.00           34,100.00    17,075.00      -              50,562.50    25 1
Denver 16,945.60         25,827.20     12,720.40      11,790.80         20,613.60  37,612.40    56,630.00  -              28 1




Figure 39 – Ardalan Calculations for Group B F110-GE-100 Locations 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
Cannon AFB is the Ardalan-selected location; however, the authors selected 
Tinker AFB as the distribution center based on its role as engine repair and overhaul 
depot. 
 Calculations for GEAE Group C locations are as follows: 
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FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL 0 266.8 572.1 334.1 466.5 31 1
Madison 266.8 0 409.3 434.9 447 25 1
Sioux Falls 572.1 409.3 0 852.9 863.2 44 1
Springfield, OH 334.1 434.9 852.9 0 212.1 53 1
Selfridge 466.5 447 863.2 212.1 0 43 1
FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL -                    8,270.80       17,735.10      10,357.10           14,461.50    31 1
Madison 6,670.00           -                10,232.50      10,872.50           11,175.00    25 1
Sioux Falls 25,172.40         18,009.20     -                 37,527.60           37,980.80    44 1
Springfield, OH 17,707.30         23,049.70     45,203.70      -                      11,241.30    53 1
Selfridge 20,059.50         19,221.00     37,117.60    9,120.30           -             43 1




Figure 40 – Ardalan Calculations for Group C F110-GE-100 Locations 
Without manipulating the weighted priorities, Springfield, Ohio, is the Ardalan-
selected location.  However, Springfield, Ohio, is over 260 miles more distant from 
Tinker AFB than Springfield, Illinois.  Accordingly, a slight modification of priority 
using entirely subjective inputs yields the following: 
FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL 0 266.8 572.1 334.1 466.5 31 1.2
Madison 266.8 0 409.3 434.9 447 25 1
Sioux Falls 572.1 409.3 0 852.9 863.2 44 1
Springfield, OH 334.1 434.9 852.9 0 212.1 53 1
Selfridge 466.5 447 863.2 212.1 0 43 1
FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL -                    9,924.96       21,282.12      12,428.52           17,353.80    31 1.2
Madison 6,670.00           -                10,232.50      10,872.50           11,175.00    25 1
Sioux Falls 25,172.40         18,009.20     -                 37,527.60           37,980.80    44 1
Springfield, OH 17,707.30         23,049.70     45,203.70      -                      11,241.30    53 1
Selfridge 20,059.50         19,221.00     37,117.60    9,120.30           -             43 1




Figure 41 – Weighted Ardalan Calculations for Group C F110-GE-100 Locations 
With the weighted modification, the Ardalan Method-selected location is 
Springfield, Illinois. 
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 Calculations for GE Group D locations are as follows: 
FROM Andrews Richmond Atlantic City* Syracuse DEMAND WEIGHT
Andrews 0 116.6 165.5 373.1 29 1
Richmond 116.6 0 272.4 473.1 25 1
Atlantic City* 165.5 272.4 0 304.5 20 1
Syracuse 373.1 473.1 304.5 0 33 1
FROM Andrews Richmond Atlantic City* Syracuse DEMAND WEIGHT
Andrews -                    3,381.40       4,799.50        10,819.90           29 1
Richmond 2,915.00           -                6,810.00        11,827.50           25 1
Atlantic City* 3,310.00           5,448.00       -                 6,090.00             20 1
Syracuse 12,312.30         15,612.30     10,048.50    -                    33 1
TOTAL 18,537.30         24,441.70     21,658.00    28,737.40         
TO
TO
* Atlantic City is converting from the F100 to the F110 engine--FY06 demand is for F100-PW-220s
 
Figure 42 – Ardalan Calculations for Group D F110-GE-100 Locations 
Andrews AFB is the Ardalan-selected location and the preferred location as it is 
the sole AD location in Group D. 
 With commonality and the 500sm criteria established in Section IV.E. above, the 
determined groupings, with AD locations identified by base name and ANG/AFR 
locations identified by place or city name are as follows: 
Commonality Groupings 
A:  Great Falls, Hill 
B:  Fresno, Luke, Nellis, Tucson 
C:  Albuquerque, Cannon, Des Moines, Denver, Ft. Smith, Ft. Worth, Homestead, 
Houston, Montgomery, San Antonio, Tinker, Tulsa 
D:  Duluth, Ft. Wayne, Madison, Selfridge, Springfield (IL), Springfield (OH), Sioux 
Falls, Toledo 
E:  Andrews, Atlantic City, Richmond, Syracuse, Burlington 
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 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
Commonality Group A: 
FROM Hill Great Falls DEMAND WEIGHT
Hill 0 533.3 297 1
Great Falls 533.3 0 53 1
FROM Hill Great Falls DEMAND WEIGHT
Hill 0 158390.1 297 1
Great Falls 28264.9 0 53 1




Figure 43 – Ardalan Calculations for Group A Commonality Locations 
These values are identical to the GEAE Group A values:  Hill AFB remains the 
obvious choice. 
 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
Commonality Group B: 
FROM Luke Nellis Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke 0 302 575.1 144.7 273 1
Nellis 302 0 399.7 436.1 66 1
Fresno 575.1 399.7 0 709.3 34 1
Tucson 144.7 436.1 709.3 0 102 1
FROM Luke Nellis Fresno Tucson DEMAND WEIGHT
Luke -                    82,446.00     157,002.30   39,503.10           273 1
Nellis 19,932.00         -                26,380.20     28,782.60           66 1
Fresno 19,553.40         13,589.80     -                24,116.20           34 1
Tucson 14,759.40         44,482.20    72,348.60   -                    102 1




Figure 44 – Ardalan Calculations for Group B Commonality Locations 
Luke AFB is both the Ardalan-selected location and the authors’ preferred 
location. 
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 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
Commonality Group C: 
FROM Tinker Ft Smith Tulsa Des Moines Houston San Antonio Cannon Albuquerque Ft Worth Montgomery Homestead Denver DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker 0 179.4 117 539.1 458.9 470.4 368.8 546.8 193.5 777.4 1456.6 605.2 1 1
Ft Smith 179.4 0 120.9 469.8 463.5 550.2 544.7 722.8 292.9 605.7 1279.1 780.9 29 1
Tulsa 117 120.9 0 427.7 513.7 545.2 469.1 647.1 284.6 723.8 1397.3 666.4 18 1
Des Moines 539.1 469.8 427.7 0 926.5 957.9 854.7 967.8 700.6 919.1 1570.4 665.1 25 1
Houston 458.9 463.5 513.7 926.5 0 217.5 638.2 855.4 290.7 628.5 1188.3 1026.1 33 1
San Antonio 470.4 550.2 545.2 957.9 217.5 0 495.2 712.2 281.4 832.6 1389.9 922.4 49 1
Cannon 368.8 544.7 469.1 854.7 638.2 495.2 0 217.1 399.6 1073.3 1761.5 454.3 97 1
Albuquerque 546.8 722.8 647.1 967.8 855.4 712.2 217.1 0 608.6 1292.6 1980.8 421.1 38 1
Ft Worth 193.5 292.9 284.6 700.6 290.7 281.4 399.6 608.6 0 675.4 1364 736.2 25 1
Montgomery 777.4 605.7 723.8 919.1 628.5 832.6 1073.3 1292.6 675.4 0 684 1343.3 44 1
Homestead 1456.6 1279.1 1397.3 1570.4 1188.3 1389.9 1761.5 1980.8 1364 683 0 2022.5 25 1
Denver 605.2 780.9 666.4 665.1 1026.1 922.4 454.3 421.1 736.2 1343.3 2022.5 0 28 1
TO
FROM Tinker Ft Smith Tulsa Des Moines Houston San Antonio Cannon Albuquerque Ft Worth Montgomery Homestead Denver DEMAND WEIGHT
Tinker -                    179.40         117.00          539.10                458.90         470.40          368.80         546.80           193.50         777.40           1,456.60      605.20         1 1
Ft Smith 5,202.60           -              3,506.10       13,624.20           13,441.50    15,955.80     15,796.30    20,961.20      8,494.10      17,565.30      37,093.90    22,646.10    29 1
Tulsa 2,106.00           2,176.20      -               7,698.60             9,246.60      9,813.60       8,443.80      11,647.80      5,122.80      13,028.40      25,151.40    11,995.20    18 1
Des Moines 13,477.50         11,745.00    10,692.50     -                      23,162.50    23,947.50     21,367.50    24,195.00      17,515.00    22,977.50      39,260.00    16,627.50    25 1
Houston 15,143.70         15,295.50    16,952.10     30,574.50           -              7,177.50       21,060.60    28,228.20      9,593.10      20,740.50      39,213.90    33,861.30    33 1
San Antonio 23,049.60         26,959.80    26,714.80     46,937.10           10,657.50    -                24,264.80    34,897.80      13,788.60    40,797.40      68,105.10    45,197.60    49 1
Cannon 35,773.60         52,835.90    45,502.70     82,905.90           61,905.40    48,034.40     -              21,058.70      38,761.20    104,110.10    170,865.50  44,067.10    97 1
Albuquerque 20,778.40         27,466.40    24,589.80     36,776.40           32,505.20    27,063.60     8,249.80      -                 23,126.80    49,118.80      75,270.40    16,001.80    38 1
Ft Worth 4,837.50           7,322.50      7,115.00       17,515.00           7,267.50      7,035.00       9,990.00      15,215.00      -              16,885.00      34,100.00    18,405.00    25 1
Montgomery 34,205.60         26,650.80    31,847.20     40,440.40           27,654.00    36,634.40     47,225.20    56,874.40      29,717.60    -                30,096.00    59,105.20    44 1
Homestead 36,415.00         31,977.50    34,932.50     39,260.00           29,707.50    34,747.50     44,037.50    49,520.00      34,100.00    17,075.00      -              50,562.50    25 1
Denver 16,945.60         21,865.20    18,659.20     18,622.80           28,730.80    25,827.20   12,720.40  11,790.80    20,613.60  37,612.40    56,630.00    -              28 1
TOTAL 207,935.10       224,474.20  220,628.90   334,894.00         244,737.40  236,706.90   213,524.70  274,935.70    201,026.30 340,687.80    577,242.80  319,074.50  
TO
 
Figure 45 – Ardalan Calculations for Group C Commonality Locations 
NOTE:  The authors used a demand of 1 at Tinker AFB to provide non-zero calculation 
results 
Ft. Worth is the Ardalan-selected location; however, for reasons previously 
identified, the authors selected Tinker AFB as the distribution center. 
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 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
Commonality Group D: 
FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge Toledo Ft Wayne Duluth DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL 0 266.8 572.1 334.1 466.5 382.9 292.5 578.6 31 1
Madison 266.8 0 409.3 434.9 447 368.4 316.6 754.5 25 1
Sioux Falls 572.1 409.3 0 852.9 863.2 784.6 729.8 365 44 1
Springfield, OH 334.1 434.9 852.9 0 212.1 133.3 127.2 754.4 53 1
Selfridge 466.5 447 863.2 212.1 0 93.5 190.9 717.1 43 1
Toledo 382.9 368.4 784.6 133.3 93.5 0 98.6 681.2 18 1
Ft Wayne 292.5 316.6 729.8 127.2 190.9 98.6 0 636.3 28 1
Duluth 578.6 754.5 365 754.4 717.1 681.2 636.3 0 27 1
FROM Springfield, IL Madison Sioux Falls Springfield, OH Selfridge Toledo Ft Wayne Duluth DEMAND WEIGHT
Springfield, IL -                    8,270.80      17,735.10    10,357.10           14,461.50    11,869.90  9,067.50    17,936.60    31 1
Madison 6,670.00           -              10,232.50    10,872.50           11,175.00    9,210.00    7,915.00    18,862.50    25 1
Sioux Falls 25,172.40         18,009.20    -              37,527.60           37,980.80    34,522.40  32,111.20  16,060.00    44 1
Springfield, OH 17,707.30         23,049.70    45,203.70    -                      11,241.30    7,064.90    6,741.60    39,983.20    53 1
Selfridge 20,059.50         19,221.00    37,117.60    9,120.30             -              4,020.50    8,208.70    30,835.30    43 1
Toledo 6,892.20           6,631.20      14,122.80    2,399.40             1,683.00      -            1,774.80    12,261.60    18 1
Ft Wayne 8,190.00           8,864.80      20,434.40    3,561.60             5,345.20      2,760.80    -            17,816.40    28 1
Duluth 15,622.20         20,371.50    9,855.00      20,368.80         19,361.70  18,392.40 17,180.10 -              27 1




Figure 46 – Ardalan Calculations for Group D Commonality Locations 
Ft. Wayne is the Ardalan-selected location; however, the authors’ selected 
Springfield, Illinois, based on its proximity to Tinker AFB and its more central location 
among the other sites.  The greatest distance from Springfield, Illinois, to any other site in 
Group D is 578.6 miles.  Every other location in Group D is over 700 miles distant from 
at least one other location.  This extends transportation time and would result in either 
lower service level or greater pipeline stocks.  In the case of Group D, no amount of 
Ardalan location site weighting sways the decision towards Springfield, Illinois, without 
also appearing as an exercise in manipulation.  Thus, the authors’ depart from Ardalan 
and select Springfield, Illinois, for subjective reasons. 
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 The following chart shows the results of the Ardalan Method calculations for 
Commonality Group E: 
FROM Andrews Richmond Atlantic City Syracuse Burlington DEMAND WEIGHT
Andrews 0 116.6 165.5 373.1 507.4 29 1.1
Richmond 116.6 0 272.4 473.1 616.6 25 1
Atlantic City 165.5 272.4 0 304.5 393.9 20 1
Syracuse 373.1 473.1 304.5 0 234.1 33 1
Burlington 507.4 616.6 393.9 234.1 0 31 1
FROM Andrews Richmond Atlantic City Syracuse Burlington DEMAND WEIGHT
Andrews -                    3,719.54       5,279.45       11,901.89           16,186.06     29 1.1
Richmond 2,915.00           -                6,810.00       11,827.50           15,415.00     25 1
Atlantic City 3,310.00           5,448.00       -                6,090.00             7,878.00       20 1
Syracuse 12,312.30         15,612.30     10,048.50     -                      7,725.30       33 1
Burlington 15,729.40         19,114.60     12,210.90   7,257.10           -               31 1




Figure 47 – Ardalan Calculations for Group E Commonality Locations 








G. F100 STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 
Assumptions
Cost Per Engine 3,113,722$  
Protection Level 99.000%
Stochastic Distribution Normal
Processing Lead Time 4.0 Days
Transportation Cost 2.50$           per Mile
Demand Unit Of Time 365              Days
Facilitate Other MX Rate 5.0%
Demand Multiplier 1.00             
Expected Demand Miles Drive Supply Consolidation Distance Annual
Removals (Engines From Time LT DLT  σLT Inventoryi  Location From Transportation
Location ICAO Per Year σYear per Year) Tinker AFB (Days) (Days) Engines Z Engines Engines Inventory  Consolidation Costs
Luke LUF 989.5 2 6 10.274  2.326 7.891 28.63        29                    
Luke LUF 321.7 43.4 306 5.030    2.326 5.561    17.97        0 -$                  
Nellis LSV 78.6 16.9 75 1.233    2.326 2.163    6.26          302 56,625.00$        
Hill Depot HIF 63.7 6.3 61 1.003    2.326 0.810    2.89          684.5 104,386.25$      
Fresno FAT 43.3 9.5 42 0.690    2.326 1.218    3.52          575.1 60,385.50$        
Tucson TUS 147.6 38.6 141 2.318    2.326 4.953    13.84        144.7 51,006.75$        
Tinker TIK 0.0 0 4 1.260    2.326 2.12548 6.20          7                      
Ft Smith FSM 29.0 11.3 28 0.307    2.326 1.186    3.07          179.4 12,558.00$        
Tulsa TUL 24.0 11.1 23 0.252    2.326 1.166    2.96          117 6,727.50$          
Des Moines DSM 26.7 11.0 26 0.285    2.326 1.146    2.95          539.1 35,041.50$        
Houston EFD 40.0 6.3 38 0.416    2.326 0.662    1.96          458.9 43,595.50$        
Toledo TOL 952.6 2 6 2.236    2.326 2.60588 8.30          9                      
Toledo TOL 23.6 12.7 23 0.378    2.326 1.627    4.16          0 -$                  
Ft Wayne FWA 33.6 7.9 32 0.526    2.326 1.015    2.89          98.6 7,888.00$          
Duluth DLH 40.7 11.5 39 0.641    2.326 1.480    4.08          681.2 66,417.00$        
Burlington BTV 43.4 7.5 42 0.690    2.326 0.962    2.93          679 71,295.00$        
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H. F110 STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 
Assumptions
Cost Per Engine 3,113,722$  
Protection Level 99.000%
Stochastic Distribution Normal
Processing Lead Time 4.0 Days
Transportation Cost 2.50$           per Mile
Demand Unit Of Time 365              Days
Facilitate Other MX Rate 5.0%
Demand Multiplier 1.00             
Expected Demand Miles Drive Supply Consolidation Distance Annual
Removals (Engines From Time LT DLT  σLT Inventoryi  Location From Transportation
Location ICAO Per Year σYear per Year) Tinker AFB (Days) (Days) Engines Z Engines Engines Inventory  Consolidation Costs
Hill (total) HIF 1133.3 3 7 4.871    2.326 2.653 11.04        12                    
Hill (total) HIF 222.7 16.5 212 4.066    2.326 2.289    9.39          0 -$                  
Great Falls GTF 44.0 9.7 42 0.805    2.326 1.340    3.92          533.3 55,996.50$        
Tinker TIK 0.0 0 4 3.671    2.326 4.387 13.88        14                    
San Antonio SKF 51.0 5.5 49 0.537    2.326 0.580    1.89          470.4 57,624.00$        
Cannon CVS 116.1 37.8 111 1.216    2.326 3.955    10.42        368.8 102,342.00$      
Albuquerque ABQ 39.1 6.7 38 0.416    2.326 0.698    2.04          546.8 51,946.00$        
Ft Worth NFW 34.1 9.8 33 0.362    2.326 1.028    2.75          193.5 15,963.75$        
Montgomery MGM 38.6 8.9 37 0.405    2.326 0.936    2.58          777.4 71,909.50$        
Homestead HST 33.9 5.2 33 0.362    2.326 0.545    1.63          1456.6 120,169.50$      
Denver BKF 35.7 7.1 34 0.373    2.326 0.740    2.09          605.2 51,442.00$        
Springfield IL SPI 604.5 2 6 3.271    2.326 2.117 8.20          9                      
Springfield IL SPI 27.3 5.6 26 0.427    2.326 0.720    2.10          0 -$                  
Madison MSN 33.3 6.3 32 0.526    2.326 0.813    2.42          266.8 21,344.00$        
Sioux Falls FSD 46.1 6.6 44 0.723    2.326 0.849    2.70          572.1 62,931.00$        
Springfield OH SGH 55.7 7.0 53 0.871    2.326 0.900    2.96          334.1 44,268.25$        
Selfridge MTC 45.9 10.4 44 0.723    2.326 1.331    3.82          466.5 51,315.00$        
Andrews ADW 1312.5 3 7 2.301    2.326 3.661 10.82        11                    
Andrews ADW 29.7 6.0 29 0.556    2.326 0.837    2.50          0 -$                  
Richmond RIC 28.9 12.6 28 0.537    2.326 1.749    4.61          116.6 8,162.00$          
Atlantic City ACY 40.1 14.2 39 0.748    2.326 1.961    5.31          165.5 16,136.25$        
Syracuse SYR 25.1 17.4 24 0.460    2.326 2.409    6.06          373.1 22,386.00$        
947.4 908 46 753,935.75$      
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I. COMMONALITY STOCK CONSOLIDATION 
 
A s sum ptio ns R esu lts
C o st Pe r E ng ine 3 ,1 13,72 2$       F 1 00 : $3,27 2 ,63 6 F 1 10 : $ 2,9 54 ,80 7 R ed uced  Inve nto ry 8 E ng ine s
P rote ctio n  L eve l 9 9 .000 % Inve nto ry R ed uction 24 ,90 9 ,772$     
S toch astic  D istr ib ution N orm al T ransp o rta tion  Savings 9 4 ,879$            pe r  Y ea r
Proces sing  Le ad T im e 4 .0 D a ys
T rans po rtation  C ost 2 .5 0$                p er  M ile
D e m a nd  U nit O f T im e 36 5                  D a ys
F acilita te  O th e r M X R a te 5 .0 %
D em and  M ultip lie r 1 .0 0                 
Exp e cte d D em and M ile s D riv e Su pp ly C on solid at io n D is ta nc e A n nu a l
R e m ova ls (E ng ine s F ro m T im e LT D LT   σL T  Inv en toryi   L oc a tio n F ro m T ran sp o rta tio n
Lo ca tio n IC A O Per Y e ar σ Y ea r pe r Y e ar ) T in ker  AF B (D ays ) (D ays ) En g in e s Z En g ines E ng in es Inve n to ry  C on solid at io n C o sts
H ill (to ta l) H IF 1 13 3.3 3 7 6 .041    2 .326 2 .7 93 1 2 .5 4        13                    
H ill (to ta l) H IF 28 6 .4 1 7.7 27 3 5 .236    2 .326 2 .45 1   1 0 .9 4        0 .0 -$                   
G rea t F a lls G T F 4 4 .0 9.7 4 2 0 .805    2 .326 1 .34 0   3 .9 2          5 33 .3 5 5 ,996 .50$         
Lu ke LU F 98 9.5 2 6 9 .271    2 .326 7 .8 50 2 7 .5 3        28                    
Lu ke LU F 32 1 .7 4 3.4 30 6 5 .030    2 .326 5 .56 1   1 7 .9 7        0 .0 -$                   
N ellis LSV 7 8 .6 1 6.9 7 5 1 .233    2 .326 2 .16 3   6 .2 6          30 2 5 6 ,625 .00$         
F re sno F AT 4 3 .3 9.5 4 2 0 .690    2 .326 1 .21 8   3 .5 2          5 75 .1 6 0 ,385 .50$         
T ucson T U S 14 7 .6 3 8.6 14 1 2 .318    2 .326 4 .95 3   1 3 .8 4        1 44 .7 5 1 ,006 .75$         
T inke r T IK 0.0 0 4 4 .932    2 .326 4 .8 75 1 6 .2 7        17                    
F t Sm ith F SM 2 9 .0 1 1.3 2 8 0 .307    2 .326 1 .18 6   3 .0 7          1 79 .4 1 2 ,558 .00$         
T u lsa T U L 2 4 .0 1 1.1 2 3 0 .252    2 .326 1 .16 6   2 .9 6          11 7 6 ,727 .50$           
D es M o in es D S M 2 6 .7 1 1.0 2 6 0 .285    2 .326 1 .14 6   2 .9 5          5 39 .1 3 5 ,041 .50$         
H ouston E FD 4 0 .0 6.3 3 8 0 .416    2 .326 0 .66 2   1 .9 6          4 58 .9 4 3 ,595 .50$         
S an  An ton io S KF 5 1 .0 5.5 4 9 0 .537    2 .326 0 .58 0   1 .8 9          4 70 .4 5 7 ,624 .00$         
C ann on C V S 11 6 .1 3 7.8 11 1 1 .216    2 .326 3 .95 5   1 0 .4 2        3 68 .8 10 2 ,342 .00$       
A lb uqu e rq ue A BQ 3 9 .1 6.7 3 8 0 .416    2 .326 0 .69 8   2 .0 4          5 46 .8 5 1 ,946 .00$         
F t W orth N F W 3 4 .1 9.8 3 3 0 .362    2 .326 1 .02 8   2 .7 5          1 93 .5 1 5 ,963 .75$         
M on tgo m e ry M G M 3 8 .6 8.9 3 7 0 .405    2 .326 0 .93 6   2 .5 8          7 77 .4 7 1 ,909 .50$         
H om e ste ad H S T 3 3 .9 5.2 3 3 0 .362    2 .326 0 .54 5   1 .6 3          14 56 .6 12 0 ,169 .50$       
D enve r B KF 3 5 .7 7.1 3 4 0 .373    2 .326 0 .74 0   2 .0 9          6 05 .2 5 1 ,442 .00$         
S pr ing fie ld  IL S PI 60 4.5 2 6 4 .816    2 .326 3 .2 17 1 2 .3 0        13                    
S pr ing fie ld  IL S PI 2 7 .3 5.6 2 6 0 .427    2 .326 0 .72 0   2 .1 0          0 .0 -$                   
M ad ison M SN 3 3 .3 6.3 3 2 0 .526    2 .326 0 .81 3   2 .4 2          2 66 .8 2 1 ,344 .00$         
S io ux F a lls F SD 4 6 .1 6.6 4 4 0 .723    2 .326 0 .84 9   2 .7 0          5 72 .1 6 2 ,931 .00$         
S pr ing fie ld  O H S G H 5 5 .7 7.0 5 3 0 .871    2 .326 0 .90 0   2 .9 6          3 34 .1 4 4 ,268 .25$         
S el fridg e M T C 4 5 .9 1 0.4 4 4 0 .723    2 .326 1 .33 1   3 .8 2          4 66 .5 5 1 ,315 .00$         
T o le do T O L 2 3 .6 1 2.7 2 3 0 .378    2 .326 1 .62 7   4 .1 6          3 82 .9 2 2 ,016 .75$         
F t W ayn e F W A 3 3 .6 7.9 3 2 0 .526    2 .326 1 .01 5   2 .8 9          2 92 .5 2 3 ,400 .00$         
D ulu th D LH 4 0 .7 1 1.5 3 9 0 .641    2 .326 1 .48 0   4 .0 8          5 78 .6 5 6 ,413 .50$         
A nd re w s A D W 1 31 2.5 3 7 3 .107    2 .326 3 .8 06 1 1 .9 6        12                    
A nd re w s A D W 2 9 .7 6.0 2 9 0 .556    2 .326 0 .83 7   2 .5 0          0 .0 -$                   
R ichm o nd R IC 2 8 .9 1 2.6 2 8 0 .537    2 .326 1 .74 9   4 .6 1          1 16 .6 8 ,162 .00$           
A tlan tic  C ity A C Y 4 0 .1 1 4.2 3 9 0 .748    2 .326 1 .96 1   5 .3 1          1 65 .5 1 6 ,136 .25$         
S yracu se S YR 2 5 .1 1 7.4 2 4 0 .460    2 .326 2 .40 9   6 .0 6          3 73 .1 2 2 ,386 .00$         
B ur ling ton B TV 4 3 .4 7.5 4 2 0 .805    2 .326 1 .03 9   3 .2 2          5 07 .4 5 3 ,277 .00$         
186 3 .3 1 78 4 83 1,17 4 ,982 .75$    
S um  o f F 1 00  + F 11 0 186 3 .3 1 78 4 91
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J. PRESENT VALUE CALCULATION 
 
Assumptions
Expense Amortization 30                      Years
Real Treasury Rates
Year Inventory Reduction Cost of Capital Inventory Savings Transportation Savings Discount Factor PV 3-Year 5-Year 7-Year 10-Year 30-Year
1987 24,909,772$                4.40% 1,096,030$              94,879$                             2.0913                  2,490,528$      2.80% 3.10% 3.50% 3.80% 4.40%
1988 24,909,772$                5.60% 1,394,947$              94,879$                             2.0031                  2,984,338$      3.50% 4.20% 4.70% 5.10% 5.60%
1989 24,909,772$                6.10% 1,519,496$              94,879$                             1.8969                  3,062,336$      4.10% 4.80% 5.30% 5.80% 6.10%
1990 24,909,772$                4.60% 1,145,850$              94,879$                             1.7879                  2,218,246$      3.20% 3.60% 3.90% 4.20% 4.60%
1991 24,909,772$                4.20% 1,046,210$              94,879$                             1.7092                  1,950,388$      3.20% 3.50% 3.70% 3.90% 4.20%
1992 24,909,772$                3.80% 946,571$                 94,879$                             1.6403                  1,708,332$      2.70% 3.10% 3.30% 3.60% 3.80%
1993 24,909,772$                4.50% 1,120,940$              94,879$                             1.5803                  1,921,344$      3.10% 3.60% 3.90% 4.30% 4.50%
1994 24,909,772$                2.80% 697,474$                 94,879$                             1.5122                  1,198,225$      2.10% 2.30% 2.50% 2.70% 2.80%
1995 24,909,772$                4.90% 1,220,579$              94,879$                             1.4710                  1,935,102$      4.20% 4.50% 4.60% 4.80% 4.90%
1996 24,909,772$                3.00% 747,293$                 94,879$                             1.4023                  1,181,006$      2.60% 2.70% 2.80% 2.80% 3.00%
1997 24,909,772$                3.60% 896,752$                 94,879$                             1.3615                  1,350,094$      3.20% 3.30% 3.40% 3.50% 3.60%
1998 24,909,772$                3.80% 946,571$                 94,879$                             1.3142                  1,368,652$      3.40% 3.50% 3.50% 3.60% 3.80%
1999 24,909,772$                2.90% 722,383$                 94,879$                             1.2661                  1,034,710$      2.60% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.90%
2000 24,909,772$                4.20% 1,046,210$              94,879$                             1.2304                  1,403,981$      3.80% 3.90% 4.00% 4.00% 4.20%
2001 24,909,772$                3.20% 797,113$                 94,879$                             1.1808                  1,053,258$      3.20% 3.20% 3.20% 3.20% 3.20%
2002 24,909,772$                3.90% 971,481$                 94,879$                             1.1442                  1,220,108$      2.10% 2.80% 3.00% 3.10% 3.90%
2003 24,909,772$                3.20% 797,113$                 94,879$                             1.1012                  982,290$         1.60% 1.90% 2.20% 2.50% 3.20%
2004 24,909,772$                3.50% 871,842$                 94,879$                             1.0671                  1,031,573$      1.60% 2.10% 2.40% 2.80% 3.50%
2005 24,909,772$                3.10% 772,203$                 94,879$                             1.0310                  893,961$         1.70% 2.00% 2.30% 2.50% 3.10%
2006 24,909,772$                3.00% 747,293$                 94,879$                             1.0000                  842,172$         2.50% 2.60% 2.70% 2.80% 3.00%
NPV of Commonality Decision in 2006 Dollars 31,830,645$    
NPV of Commonality Decision in Engine Equivalents 10.22                
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K. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS 
 
Original New % Change Baseline New % Change
Variable Value Value Difference Input NPV NPV Difference Output
3,113,722$  1,000,000$    (2,113,722)$ -67.9% 31,830,645$  12,077,071$ (19,753,574)$ -62.1%
Cost  3,113,722$  2,000,000$    (1,113,722)$ -35.8% 31,830,645$  21,422,472$ (10,408,174)$ -32.7%
Per 3,113,722$  3,000,000$    (113,722)$    -3.7% 31,830,645$  30,767,872$ (1,062,773)$   -3.3%
Engine 3,113,722$  4,000,000$    886,279$      28.5% 31,830,645$  40,113,273$ 8,282,628$     26.0%
3,113,722$  5,000,000$    1,886,279$   60.6% 31,830,645$  49,458,673$  17,628,028$   55.4%
3,113,722$  10,000,000$  6,886,279$   221.2% 31,830,645$  96,185,676$ 64,355,031$   202.2%
99.000% 90.000% -9.000% -9.091% 31,830,645$  17,281,158$ (14,549,487)$ -45.7%
99.000% 95.000% -4.000% -4.040% 31,830,645$  20,918,530$ (10,912,116)$ -34.3%
Protection 99.000% 99.000% 0.000% 0.000% 31,830,645$  31,830,645$ -$               0.0%
Level 99.000% 99.500% 0.500% 0.505% 31,830,645$  24,555,901$ (7,274,744)$   -22.9%
99.000% 99.900% 0.900% 0.909% 31,830,645$  42,742,761$ 10,912,116$   34.3%
99.000% 99.990% 0.990% 1.000% 31,830,645$  39,105,389$ 7,274,744$     22.9%
4.0               -                (4.0)              -100.000% 31,830,645$  13,643,786$ (18,186,859)$ -57.1%
Processing 4.0               2.0                 (2.0)              -50.000% 31,830,645$  24,555,901$ (7,274,744)$   -22.9%
Lead 4.0               4.0                 -               0.000% 31,830,645$  31,830,645$ -$               0.0%
Time 4.0               6.0                 2.0                50.000% 31,830,645$  28,193,273$ (3,637,372)$   -11.4%
4.0               8.0                 4.0                100.000% 31,830,645$  39,105,389$ 7,274,744$     22.9%
2.50$           0.25$             (2.25)$          -90.000% 31,830,645$  29,372,142$ (2,458,503)$   -7.7%
Transportation 2.50$           2.00$             (0.50)$          -20.000% 31,830,645$  31,284,311$ (546,334)$      -1.7%
Cost 2.50$           2.50$             -$            0.000% 31,830,645$ 31,830,645$ -$               0.0%
2.50$           3.00$             0.50$            20.000% 31,830,645$  32,376,979$ 546,334$        1.7%
2.50$           25.00$           22.50$          900.000% 31,830,645$  56,415,678$ 24,585,033$   77.2%
5.0% 0.0% -5.0% -100.000% 31,830,645$  31,962,451$ 131,806$        0.4%
Facilitate 5.0% 4.0% -1.0% -20.000% 31,830,645$  31,873,342$ 42,697$          0.1%
Other MX 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.000% 31,830,645$  31,830,645$ -$               0.0%
Rate 5.0% 6.0% 1.0% 20.000% 31,830,645$  31,769,025$  (61,620)$        -0.2%
5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 100.000% 31,830,645$  28,047,511$ (3,783,134)$   -11.9%
1.00             0.50               (0.50)            -50.000% 31,830,645$  34,116,728$ 2,286,083$     7.2%
1.00             0.80               (0.20)            -20.000% 31,830,645$  27,665,698$ (4,164,947)$   -13.1%
Demand 1.00             0.90               (0.10)            -10.000% 31,830,645$  35,190,449$ 3,359,804$     10.6%
Multiplier 1.00             1.00               -               0.000% 31,830,645$  31,830,645$ -$               0.0%
1.00             1.10               0.10              10.000% 31,830,645$  32,094,256$ 263,611$        0.8%
1.00             1.20               0.20              20.000% 31,830,645$  28,734,452$ (3,096,193)$   -9.7%
1.00             2.00               1.00              100.000% 31,830,645$  30,940,153$  (890,493)$      -2.8%
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L. LOCATION DATA LISTING 
 
User-defined Name* 
(see Note 1) ICAO Identifier*
USAF Unit Designation+ (see 
Note 2) AD ANG AFR Operational Training Depot Engine Type^ Degrees Minutes Degrees Minutes
Albuquerque, NM KABQ 150 FW X X F110GE100 35 2 106 37
Andrews AFB, MD KADW 113 FW X X F110GE100 38 47 76 52
Atlantic City, NJ KACY 177 FW X X F110GE100 39 27 74 35
Burlington, VT KBTV 158 FW X X F100PW220 44 28 73 9
Cannon AFB, NM KCVS 27 FW X X F110GE100 34 23 103 19
Denver, CO KBKF 140 FW X X F110GE100 39 42 104 45
Des Moines, IA KDSM 132 FW X X F100PW220 41 32 93 40
Duluth, MN KDLH 148 FW X X F100PW220 46 51 92 12
Ellington, TX KEFD 147 FW X X F100PW220 29 36 95 10
Fresno, CA KFAT 144 FW X X F100PW220 36 47 119 43
Ft Smith, AR KFSM 188 FW X X F100PW220 35 20 94 22
Ft Wayne, IN KFWA 122 FW X X F100PW220 40 59 85 12
Ft Worth, TX KNFW 301 FW X X F110GE100 32 46 97 26
Great Falls, MT KGTF 120 FW X X F110GE100 47 29 111 22
Hill AFB, UT KHIF 388 FW & OO-ALC/ /419 FW X X X X Both 41 7 111 58
Homestead, FL KHST 482 FW X X F110GE100 25 29 80 23
Luke AFB, AZ KLUF 56 FW/ /944 FW X X X X F100PW220 33 32 112 23
Madison, WI KMSN 115 FW X X F110GE100 43 8 89 20
Montgomery, AL KMGM 187 FW X X F110GE100 32 18 86 24
Nellis AFB, NV KLSV 57 WG X X F100PW220 36 14 115 2
Richmond, VA KRIC 192 FW X X F110GE100 37 30 77 19
San Antonio, TX KSKF 149 FW X X F110GE100 29 23 98 35
Selfridge, MI KMTC 127 FW X X F110GE100 42 37 82 50
Sioux Falls, SD KFSD 114 FW X X F110GE100 43 35 96 45
Springfield, IL KSPI 183 FW X X F110GE100 39 51 89 41
Springfield, OH KSGH 178 FW X X F110GE100 39 50 83 50
Syracuse, NY KSYR 174 FW X X F110GE100 43 7 76 6
Tinker AFB, OK KTIK OC-ALC X X Both 35 25 97 23
Toledo, OH KTOL 180 FW X X F100PW220 41 35 83 48
Tucson, AZ KTUS 162 FW X X F100PW220 32 7 110 56
Tulsa, OK KTUL 138 FW X X F100PW220 36 12 95 53
USAF COMPONENT+ PRIMARY MISSION+ Longitude*Latitude*
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Note 1:  As discussed in Appendix F, AD locations are identified by base name, 
ANG/AFR locations are identified by place or city name 
 
Note 2:  When multiple components are at a location, the USAF Unit Designation is 
listed in the following order:  AD/ANG/AFR 
 
* Data obtained/verified via www.AIRNAV.com (AirNav, 2007). 
 
+ Data obtained/verified via www.af.mil/sites/ (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 
2007). 
 
^ Data obtained/verified via USAF’s AFMC (B. Eberhart, personal communication, 29 
August 2007). 
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